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I.  Introduction 
 Economic analysts of tort law have always been preoccupied 
with the incentive effects of alternative tort liability and damage rules.  
More precisely, economically oriented tort scholars have focused on the 
question how to design a tort system that gives potential injurers and 
potential victims the ex ante incentive to minimize the costs of accidents, 
including the costs of preventing accidents as well as the administrative 
costs of the regulatory regime.1  Viewed this way, tort law is just another 
regulatory tool, akin to Pigovian taxes or command-and-control 
regulations, which policymakers can deploy to help manage the problem 
of negative externalities.2 
 
                                                 
∗ Wade H. McCree Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School.  The participants at the Duke Law School Legal Theory Workshop and the 
University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop provided helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this Article, for which I am grateful.  I also appreciate the financial 
support provided by the University of Michigan Law School’s Cook Fund.    
1 The canonical formulation of the cost-minimization goal of tort law comes from 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (170); see also 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); 
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS (2003). 
2 Some economic analysts are famous for making the descriptive claim that the 
common law of tort, like the rest of the common law, tends towards efficiency.  R. 
Poser, Economic Analysis of Law.  This positive project has largely fallen out of favor 
among scholars working in law schools, although some economists still pursue the 
hypothesis. See, e.g., Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Precedent 
(NBER working paper, 2005), available on line at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687801. In this Article I do not 
claim that the common law has a general tendency towards efficient outcomes, 
although I do point out a few tort doctrines that are at least consistent with efficiency 
norms. 
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Viewing tort law as a system of deterrence or regulation is now 
standard within the legal literature. This regulatory/deterrence 
perspective has even been expanded to encompass non-legal forms of 
social control.  In recent years, legal scholars have come to view non-
legal social norms and informal non-monetary sanctions as an alternative 
to formal legal rules when it comes to optimizing private incentives.3  
Under this regulatory account of social norms, just as a potential 
injurer’s ex ante harm-avoidance incentives can be altered by the threat 
of ex post tort liability or by Pigovian taxes, those same incentives can be 
affected by the knowledge that the breach of a social norm may result in 
a loss of valuable reputation in the community, perhaps accompanied or 
anticipated by personal feelings of shame or guilt.  This idea – that social 
norms can regulate behavior, creating “order without law” – has been the 
subject of considerable attention among legal scholars for many years.4  
Indeed, there are now competing theoretical accounts as to when social 
norms will tend to be more or less efficient or welfare-maximizing than 
formal legal rules.5   
 
The foregoing summary of the standard L&E deterrence/cost-
internalization framework will be familiar to most readers.6  What may 
                                                 
3 For recent scholarly attention to social norms, see Symposium, The Legal 
Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Social Norms, Social 
Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537 (1998); and 
Symposium Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996).   
4 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
5 Ellickson, supra note __ (emphasizing importance of close-knit groups and absence of 
externalities to formation of efficient norms); Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: 
The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
133 (1996) (); Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 Am. 
L. & Econ. Rev. 227 (2002); Paul Mahoney & Chris Sanchirico, Competing norms and 
social evolution: Is the fittest norm efficient?, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2027 (2001). 
6 Some commentators draw a terminological distinction between “deterrence” and “cost 
internalization.”  See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 
1523 (1984).  When policy makers can identify a standard of behavior that it regards as 
socially desirable (presumably because the total social benefits exceed the social costs), 
then those policy makers would simply seek to deter any behavior that diverges from 
that standard.  On this view, we might speak of tort law as deterring negligent behavior 
or the criminal law deterring crime.   However, when there is an activity that is known 
to produce external social costs (but is not known necessarily to be socially undesirable 
overall), then society may decide to internalize that external cost to the party engaging 
in the activity and then allow that party to equate marginal benefit and marginal cost.  
More often than not, this technical distinction between deterrence and cost-
3
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be surprising, however, is the relative lack of scholarly attention devoted 
to figuring out how these various alternative, often overlapping, and 
potentially conflicting systems of regulation are, or should be 
coordinated, with each other.  After all, if an external harm is being 
internalized or deterred by one regulatory tool, it need not, and often 
should not, be internalized or deterred again by another regulatory tool.   
 
Take the quintessential example of a negative externality – some 
activity that spews CO2 into the atmosphere thereby contributing to the 
global problem of climate change.  If a fully cost-internalizing Pigovian 
tax (say, a carbon-based tax of the sort that many commentators have 
recently proposed) were imposed on domestic companies by the U.S. 
government, there obviously need not (and, from an efficiency 
perspective, should not) be a state-level carbon-based tax on the same 
polluters for the same carbon emissions.  Nor should there be any 
overlapping command-and-control regulations or any other sort of 
regulation (including tort liability) designed to regulate the same 
conduct.  It – the external harm caused by CO2 emission – has, by 
assumption, already been fully regulated.  Redundant regulation 
represents unnecessary administrative costs and potentially excessive 
deterrence. The same analysis can be applied to torts.  Consider 
automobile accidents or product-related injuries or medical malpractice 
harms.  All theoretically are potentially affected by the same problem of 
overlapping, uncoordinated, and thus potentially redundant sanctions, 
which means either over-deterrence or duplicative and therefore 
excessive administrative costs, or both.  Again, this is a subject that has 
been largely neglected in the literature.7 
                                                                                                                       
internalization gets ignored in the literature; and the terms get used synonymously.  In 
this Article, I use the terms interchangeably unless the context clearly calls for one or 
the other.   
7 There are some notable exceptions.  Shavell has provided the most comprehensive and 
systematic economic account of how to choose the optimal tool or combination of tools 
for regulating risk; and my analysis, especially in Part __, will borrow from his.  See, 
e.g., SHAVELL, supra note __, at 277-90 (Ch. 12; “Liability versus Other Approaches to 
the Control of Risk.”); and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of 
Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. (1984).  This Article differs in that it approaches the deterrence 
question from a torts perspective in the sense already discussed: taking all non-tort 
systems of regulation as given or fixed and imagining how tort law how tort law should 
respond to the existence of alternative non-tort systems of risk regulation.  In addition, 
this article focuses on the problem of redundancy of overlapping regulatory regimes, 
which is an emphasis found in none of the prior work on deterrence.  As for the overlap 
between legal and non-legal regimes of deterrence, Shavell, Polinksy, and Kaplow have 
written on the optimal mix of monetary and non-monetary sanctions (see infra sources 
4
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In theory, the problem of redundant regulation is just as 
damaging to the goal of efficiency and social welfare maximization (or 
cost minimization) as are the negative externalities that these regulatory 
tools are designed to counter-act.  This is why it just as important that a 
carbon-based tax not be set too high as that it not be set too low – or not 
enacted at all.  How do we avoid the problem of redundant regulation?  
Ideally, there would be some central, intra-jurisdictional policy planner 
who would harmonize the various systems of deterrence, choosing the 
particular system or combination of systems that is most efficient for the 
purposes at hand.  And this sort of centralized harmonization sometimes 
happens.  For example, when Congress enacts a given regulatory regime 
it sometimes makes explicit the extent to which overlapping state law 
regulations (including common law tort claims) are to be displaced or, to 
use a narrower and more specialized term, preempted.  Unfortunately, as 
recent Supreme Court preemption decisions make clear, Congress often 
fails (or declines) to be explicit about this displacement or pre-emption 
question, thus leaving courts hearing tort cases to determine when 
common tort actions been impliedly preempted and when not.8  
Similarly, when the alternative non-tort system of regulation is not a 
federal regulatory law but something else (state regulatory law or even 
social norms), the regulatory coordination decision is nevertheless left to 
                                                                                                                       
cited in notes ___).  But again, they have not focused on the problem of redundant 
sanctions.  Also, within the literature on norms and law, there are the occasional 
discussions of how one or the other system of social control gets called into action.  For 
example, in Ellickson’s elaborate taxonomy of the types of rules, types of sanctions, 
and types of “controllers” (parties who either apply the rules or impose sanctions or 
both), he discusses what he calls “controller-selecting rules,” which are rules (for 
example, social norms) that govern whether or not, and under what conditions, parties 
will resort to the formal legal system in the first place.  See ELLICKSON, supra note __, 
at 134-35.  But Ellickson does not focus on the question addressed here:  assuming the 
existence of a tort system, and assuming that system has been invoked, how should a 
court (one type of government controller) coordinate the existence of legal and non-
legal rules and sanctions?  There has been some scholarship on the interplay between 
custom and tort law, the most famous example of which is Richard Epstein’s article on 
the T.J. Hooper case.  See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory 
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1992) (arguing that in 
general courts should defer to custom in negligence analyses).  The present Article 
provides a more general framework for understanding the role of custom in tort law, 
again within the standard deterrence picture, and it argues for a different conclusion 
than the one reached by Epstein.  See infra text accompanying notes __. 
8 See the discussion of the Supreme Court’s preemption rationale in Wyeth v. Levine 
(USSC 2009) in Part IV below. 
5
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the common law courts adjudicating tort claims applying traditional tort 
doctrines.      
 
In this Article, working from within this L&E deterrence 
tradition, I sketch out a general framework for understanding how tort 
law might be coordinated or harmonized with overlapping alternative 
systems of deterrence or regulation.  Again, the ideal solution would be 
for a central policy maker to choose the optimal combination of 
regulatory tools, using tort law when that regulatory tool is optimal but 
substituting direct regulation or Pigovian taxes when those tools make 
more sense – or various combinations of all three, depending on the 
situation.9  This Article takes a different approach.  It works from the 
perspective of tort law, taking all non-tort systems of regulation as given 
or fixed.  What does this mean?  One way to think of it would be to 
imagine a common law court that (a) is deciding a tort case, (b) must 
take as given the existence of overlapping non-tort system of regulation, 
(c) must (obviously) abide by any explicit legislative pronouncement on 
how overlapping laws are to be coordinated, but (d) in the absence of 
such explicit pronouncement wishes to apply a coordination principle 
that optimizes ex ante incentives to minimize accident costs, including 
(importantly) the administrative costs of the system.  This version of the 
tort-law perspective on the optimal regulation question focuses on the 
individual court (probably appellate courts, but conceivably trial courts) 
applying state common law principles of tort law, while simultaneously 
(through common law coordination principles discussed below) taking 
into account the wider regulatory world.  And again, the overarching 
Calabresian goal is that of minimizing the costs of accidents.  The point 
of this perspective is engage in a thought experiment to see how a tort 
court seeking to minimize the cost of accidents should take into account 
the existence overlapping regulatory regimes.   
 
Alternatively, the tort-centric perspective could focus on the role 
of legislatures (state or federal) in designing tort-reform legislation to 
guide the decisions of tort courts in coordinating common law tort 
principles with non-tort systems of regulation.  Again, the idea would be 
to hold non-tort regulatory regimes as fixed and then to see how tort law 
should respond to the existing non-tort regulatory regime, assuming a 
goal of welfare maximization and efficient accident-cost minimization.10  
                                                 
9 This is essentially the approach of Shavell and others.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
10 One might complain that, if we are talking about a legislature (at least if we are 
talking about Congress) choosing optimal tort/non-tort regulatory coordination rules, 
6
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This tort-centric approach in one sense embodies a combination of 
policymaking ambition and modesty: It is ambitious in that it imagines 
those who “make” tort law (judges or legislators) as trying to achieve 
some version of accident-cost minimization and can choose among 
versions of tort liability rules and damages measures to as to best achieve 
that goal; it is modest in that it does not assume that all policy tools are 
up for grabs, but rather that non-tort regulation must be accepted and 
assumed to be an optimal within its domain.   
 
Part II lays the groundwork for the Article’s analysis by 
reviewing some of the basic principles and assumptions of economic tort 
theory and regulatory theory.  Part III then builds the basic framework 
for how tort law should be coordinated or harmonized with various non-
tort systems of regulation.  To build the framework, that Part uses the 
example of a negligence-based tort regime overlapping with command-
and-control agency-based regulation.  Part IV then gives some flesh to 
this framework by applying it to a particularly salient example of the 
tort/regulation overlap problem:  the example of federal preemption of 
state products liability law.  Rather than do an exhaustive review of the 
preemption cases and literature (which would take us well beyond the 
scope of this Article), this Part uses a few recent Supreme Court 
preemption cases as a lens through which to view the broader questions 
of institutional cooperation between common law courts and other 
regulators.  Part V then broadens the analysis by sketching out how the 
analysis gets more complicated when other types of tort/non-tort overlap, 
such as when Pigovian taxes overlap with strict liability.  One of the Part 
V also considers how the framework might apply when the non-tort 
system of regulation is some type of social norm the breach of which 
gives rise to informal (nonmonetary) sanctions. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. Recap of a Few Principles (and Assumptions) of Tort (and 
Regulatory) Theory 
 
For some readers, it will be useful to review the highpoints of 
economic theory of tort and regulatory theory.  For others, this review 
                                                                                                                       
then it makes less sense to treat the non-tort regulatory regimes as fixed.  And that is 
why, as I talk about federal regulation below, I sometimes consider the possibility of 
altering the non-tort regulatory regime.  However, even when the tort lawmaker is 
Congress, there will often be times when the non-tort regulatory regime is best 
understood as fixed, either because that regime is politically difficult to change or 
because it is optimal. 
7
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will be unnecessary and maybe even a waste of time.  The latter group (if 
you know who you are) may want to skip to Part III.     
 
The Rationality Assumption and the Exclusive Focus on 
Efficiency 
 
A key assumption underlying the economic analysis of law 
generally and torts in particular is the view that individuals and firms for 
the most part behave rationally, that the relevant parties can and do 
weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and make choices that on 
balance tend to maximize their own expected utility.  As behavioral 
researchers have exhaustively documented in recent years, and as many 
others have suspected for decades before that, this rationality assumption 
is often unrealistic.11  Individuals frequently exhibit behavior that 
diverges demonstrably and systematically from what has traditionally 
been considered rational.  Nevertheless, at least in areas in which the 
regulated parties are likely to be knowledgeable and sophisticated (and 
especially when they are subject to the evolutionary pressures of market 
competition), the classical conception of rationality still seems a decent 
starting point for analysis.  Thus, for the remainder of the Article, I will 
proceed as if optimizing ex ante incentives through tort law, as well as 
through other forms of regulation, is both feasible, in the sense that the 
relevant actors behave rationally, and desirable, in the sense that doing 
so would tend to maximize social welfare.12    
 
One assumption that is standard in the economic analysis of torts 
is that accident law should be concerned with providing compensation to 
injured victims only insofar as doing so furthers the instrumental goal of 
deterrence.  There is no intrinsic value, on this view, in compensating 
injured plaintiffs through the tort system.  The standard justification for 
this seemingly cold-hearted perspective is that compensation for harms 
of all sorts, including harms caused by others’ torts, can almost always 
be more efficiently and comprehensively provided through some form of 
                                                 
11 For a review of some of the most interesting findings of the behavioral turn in L&E, 
see BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) (Sunstein, Cass R., ed.). 
12 Most normative law-and-economics scholarship adopts, explicitly or implicitly, some 
version of welfarism.  I follow that approach in this Article, although I occasionally 
address in welfarist terms considerations that some would regard as strictly 
deontological or nonconsequentialist.  For an extended development of a theory of 
“weak welfarism” that combines welfare maximization with other non-welfarist 
criteria, see MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS (2006). 
8
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private or public first-party insurance.13  Under the L&E approach, then, 
other than the deterrence function, there is no independent value of 
having injurers pay damages to their victims. 
 
This view rather famously conflicts with the corrective justice 
account of tort law.  According to corrective justice theorists, when an 
individual wrongfully harms another (that is, she harms someone under 
circumstances in which it was her duty not to harm that party), the 
injurer then incurs an obligation to repair that harm; and tort litigation 
provides a means of enforcing this obligation.14  On the corrective 
justice view, then, there is an intrinsic value to the “bilateral structure” of 
tort litigation under which the victim seeks recovery from the injurer.  
The idea is that justice requires that a party who wrongfully caused the 
harm be the one to make the injured party whole.  Furthermore, under 
corrective justice, it is of no independent significance – indeed, it is 
irrelevant – whether tort law does or does not create optimal ex ante 
accident-avoidance incentives.  By contrast, under the economic 
perspective, as mentioned above, there is nothing intrinsically important 
about forcing a particular tort defendant to pay a particular victim a 
particular amount.  The bilateral structure of tort litigation, where the 
victims sues the injurer for recovery, is merely instrumental to the goal 
of optimizing ex ante accident-avoidance incentives.  Thus, under the 
economic approach, if overall social welfare were maximized (and costs 
minimized) by having a system in which no direct compensation is paid 
by injurer to victim (in which there are no tort claims), that would be 
fine.   
 
                                                 
13 There is nothing inconsistent with using tort law to regulate behavior and having 
injured victims seek compensation for their injuries in the first instance from their first-
party insurers (whether it is a private company or the government).  Double recovery is 
avoided, and causal responsibility properly assigned, through the interplay of the 
subrogation doctrine and the collateral source rule.  By paying for the tort victim’s 
losses, the first-party insurer becomes “subrogated to” the tort victim’s claim against 
any tortfeasors.  The traditional collateral source rule, which forbids tort courts from 
taking into account the tort victim’s payments from “collateral sources” such as 
insurance, protects the first-party insurer’s subrogated tort claim against the injurer.  
Subrogation clauses are usually found in first-party insurance contracts; however, even 
if no contractual provision is present, the doctrine of equitable subrogation serves 
largely the same function.   
14 See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ARTHER RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1998); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW (1995); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa 
L. Rev. 449 (1992). 
9
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There is in fact an efficiency argument for adopting a regulatory 
regime that makes injurers pay damages to their victims – an efficiency 
story that explains the bilateral structure of tort law.  Under such a 
system, tort victims, who have important information about the nature 
and extent of the harm caused to them, have an incentive come forward 
and initiate the regulatory machinery.  In that sense, the corrective justice 
story and the deterrence story would point in the same direction.  That 
will not always be the case, however.  And when there is divergence 
between the efficiency and corrective justice, the policy maker – whether 
it is a legislature or a court in a tort case – will have to choose which 
vision of tort law to endorse.  This point will be important below when 
we examine the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on 
coordinating tort law with federal safety regulation. 
Choosing the Optimal Liability Rule: Negligence v. Strict Liability   
 
According to the standard deterrence framework, there are two 
basic issues in the design of an efficient tort regime:  choosing the 
optimal liability rule and choosing the optimal level of damages.15  As to 
the liability-rule question, the choice is generally between some version 
of negligence and some version of strict liability.16  The economic 
advantages and disadvantages of a negligence rule have been 
exhaustively rehearsed in the literature.  Under a negligence rule, the 
injurer is let completely off the hook for any of the harm that she causes 
if she can show that she was not negligent, that she behaved reasonably, 
that she took what the doctrine calls “due care.”17  And if we assume that 
the court defines the due care standard at the efficient level (that is, that 
courts get the negligence analysis right, from an efficiency perspective), 
then the negligence rule, backed up by a sufficiently large sanction, will 
induce potential injurers to behave efficiently in terms of care levels.  
This is because potential injurers can avoid any responsibility for 
whatever harm they might cause if they act with reasonably.  Due care, 
                                                 
15 All of what follows in this section of Part II can be found in the systematic work of 
Steven Shavell, Mitchell Polinsky, and Richard Posner.  See supra  sources cited in 
note 1. 
16 This is a vast oversimplification of the theoretical literature on liability rules, as there 
are numerous other alternatives to straight negligence and strict liability, including most 
obviously regimes that take into account in some way the behavior and potential fault 
of the victim in causing the accident.  But again, I am trying to avoid these 
complications by focusing on situations in which only the injurer can affect the 
probability or severity of the external harm.  
17 Other elements of a tort claim, in addition to causation, include a showing that the 
injurer owed a duty to avoid the harm that the victim sustained. 
10
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in a sense, is a sort of universal safe harbor for avoiding tort liability.  
So, as a simple illustration, if a potential injurer could spend $30 on risk 
reduction and by so doing avoid any possible responsibility for the 
$100,000 harm that her behavior might cause (with, say, a probability of 
1 in 1000), then that care-level investment would look pretty attractive.  
This is why, in the theoretical deterrence literature on torts, a negligence 
rule is thought to optimize potential injurers’ ex ante “care levels.”   This 
is the L&E way of saying that negligence induces potential injurers to 
take all cost-justified steps to avoid, or minimize the risk of, harm to 
third parties.    
 
That’s the upside of negligence.  There are downsides as well.  
One is that while negligence can optimize potential injurers’ care levels, 
it also tends to produce excessive potential injurer activity levels.18  
What are “activity levels”?  Think of it this way:  With most risky 
activities, there will always be some residual (not-cost-justifiably-
avoidable) risk of harm, even if the potential injurer makes all optimal 
investments in care.  Driving a car, for example, entails a certain amount 
of residual risk even if one observes all traffic laws and generally takes 
all appropriate safety precautions.  The same point could be made about 
medical treatments or consumer products or prescription drugs or most 
anything that can cause harm.  The problem is that, for any such activity, 
if the potential injurer complies with the negligence standard, she 
thereafter does not bear (and hence, under traditional theory, she will 
externalize) the cost of third-party harms that occur as a result of the 
residual risk inherent in the activity.  Under a negligence regime, in other 
words, this risk of unpreventable harms is externalized to the third-party 
victim, causing an efficiency problem.19  Hence, if a product 
manufacturer satisfies the risk-benefit product-defect test, it can safely 
ignore the possibility of harms caused by its products.20  The resulting 
excessive injurer activity levels are, again, a sort of negative externality.  
 
                                                 
18 For the original and still authoritative analysis of the care-level/activity-level 
distinction, see Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 1 
(1980). 
19 For a recent discussion of how negligence law tries to sort out unpreventable harms 
from preventable harms (or harms caused by negligence), see Grady, Mark F., 
Unavoidable Accident (January 1, 2009), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research 
Paper No. 09-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337288. 
20 Most versions of the “design defect” doctrine in products liability law approximate a 
negligence standard.  Cases involving “manufacturing defects” come closer to strict 
liability. 
11
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This negative externality is in theory corrected by strict liability.  
Strict liability, from the perspective of the injurer, can be understood as a 
type of Pigovian tax that is implemented by a court (rather than by an 
agency) after an injury occurs and after suit is brought by the injured 
victim.  As with other Pigovian taxes, however, it has the effect of 
internalizing external harms.  Under strict liability, the potential injurer is 
not only induced to take optimal care, since doing so will reduce the size 
of her ex post liability, but also is encouraged to engage in the activity 
only if the benefits exceed the full social costs, including the costs of the 
tax.  This is because the residual risk is shifted from the potential victims 
to the potential injurers.21 
 
Another drawback of negligence is the amount of information 
that it requires of courts.  To do the analysis properly, the court must 
have an enormous amount of data, considerably more than is required to 
do strict liability.  To apply a strict liability rule, the court need only 
determine the amount of the harm actually caused to the victim by the 
injurer.  To apply the negligence standard, by contrast, the court must not 
only do the causation and damages analysis, but must also have 
information about the cost of the precaution to injurer (that is, it must be 
able to calculate the “B” in Learned Hand’s famous “BPL” negligence 
test), as well as information about the precise effect of the safety 
investments on the expected harm to third parties (“PL”).22  And if the 
precaution reduces the benefit of the activity itself to the potential 
                                                 
21 Just as negligence has a problem dealing with injurer activity levels, strict liability 
has a problem optimizing victim activity levels, and for the same reason:  If injurers are 
strict liability for harms, there is no reason for victims to take care; and this problem 
remains even if a contributory negligence defense is introduced to the strict liability 
rule, which would induce victims to take due care but not to optimize activity levels.  In 
sum, the standard conclusion in the literature then is this:  A negligence rule (or a rule 
of negligence with contributory negligence) optimizes injurer and victim care levels 
and victim activity levels, but not injurer activity levels.  And strict liability (with a 
defense of contributory negligence) optimizes both sides’ care levels and injurer 
activity levels, but not victim activity levels.  Shavell.  In this Article, for simplicity I 
ignore victim care levels. 
22 United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  In that case, Judge 
Learned Hand introduced the “BPL” formula that became synonymous with the 
economic approach to negligence law.  In that formula, “B” is the burden or cost of the 
precaution that the injurer in the case failed to take; “P” is the ex ante probability of that 
particular type of loss occurring; “L” is the loss itself, such that PL is the reduction in 
expected harm that would have occurred had the injurer invested ex ante in B.  Thus, 
under the Learned Hand test, the injurer will be deemed negligent (or will be found to 
have taken less than due care) when B < PL.  See Posner, supra note __. 
12
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 105 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art105
   12 
 
injurer, that fact has to be taken into account as well, as part of the cost 
of precaution.  This is a lot of information to expect a court to acquire 
and process accurately.   
 
Despite the relative simplicity of the strict liability analysis, it is 
sometimes said that negligence may have lower administrative costs than 
strict liability, for two different reasons.  First, under a negligence 
standard, although each case may be relatively costly to administer 
(because of the higher information burden associated with the BPL 
analysis), there should be fewer actual trials than with strict liability, as 
any cases involving clear compliance with the negligence standard (clear 
absence of fault on the part of the injurer) will not be brought at all.  
Under the strict liability standard, by contrast, the injured victim need 
not show fault and therefore will have an incentive to bring a suit 
whenever he believes he can demonstrate that the injurer caused his 
harm (and when the likely damage award exceeds the victim’s costs of 
litigation).  Thus, the question is whether the higher-administrative-cost-
per-case effect of negligence is overwhelmed by the larger-number-of-
cases effect of strict liability.23  
 
Optimal Damages   
 
In addition to choosing the optimal liability rule, the designer of 
an efficient tort regime must choose the optimal level of damages.  In 
general, the conventional wisdom is that sanctions equal to the harm 
caused will generally produce efficient ex ante risk-reduction incentives.  
In the case of a negligence rule, a threatened sanction equal to the harm 
caused will usually be enough (sometimes more than enough) to induce 
ex ante compliance with the efficient due care standard, as the potential 
injurers will happily spend a little on precautions ex ante to get the large 
benefit of freedom from all damage liability.  (As in the example above, 
the $30 investment eliminates a cost with an expected value of $100.  A 
no-brainer for the potential injurer.)  The optimal sanction under a 
negligence regime, however, need not necessarily be exactly equal to the 
harm caused; it can be higher or lower, just so long as that sanction is 
enough to induce compliance with the efficient standard of care.  Indeed, 
the threatened sanction can be almost infinite, so long as due care is 
                                                 
23 SHAVELL, supra note __, at 264 (“Although the volume of claims should be greater 
under strict liability, the average administrative cost per claim should be higher under 
the negligence rule.”). 
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sufficient to eliminate all liability and there is no risk of judicial error 
and no risk aversion.24   
 
Under strict liability, it is important that damages be set at the 
amount of the harm caused, or set so that the expected value of the 
sanction experienced by the potential injurer is equal to the expected 
value of the external harm.  In some cases this means the sanction should 
equal the harm.  That assumes, however, that the likelihood that the 
sanction will in fact be imposed is one-hundred percent in the event of 
the harm.  That is, the sanction should equal the harm when there is no 
possibility that the harm will go undetected and thus unsanctioned.  Of 
course, if there is some possibility that the harm will go undetected, then 
the sanction imposed on the injurer will need to be increased so that the 
expected value of the sanction is equal to the expected value of the 
external harm.25  If the damages under strict liability are set too low (so 
that their expected value is less than the expected value of the external 
harm), then potential injurer activity levels will be too high, as the 
external costs will not be fully internalized.  If the strict liability sanction 
is set too high, there will be over-deterrence and the potential injurer 
activity levels will be too low.  Both are inefficient outcomes. 
 
Tort Law vs. Agency-Based Ex Ante Regulation 
 
Because tort law can be viewed as a form of regulation, it can 
therefore be compared and contrasted with other forms of regulation.  
For example, tort law is sometimes characterized as an ex post system of 
regulation, in the sense that the tort system is called into action only after 
some harm occurs.26  By contrast, most regulation, or what the average 
lay person would call regulation, takes place ex ante, before the harm 
occurs.  The quintessential form of ex ante regulation is agency-based 
command-and-control regulation.  Under classic command-and-control 
regulation, the regulating agency instructs the regulated parties precisely 
what risk-reducing steps must be taken for the parties to be allowed to 
                                                 
24 The sanction in some cases could be lower than full damages and still induce optimal 
care.  In the example in the text, any damages over $30,000 would be sufficient to do 
that. 
25 The standard way of dealing with a less than certain sanction is to add a kicker, 
enough to make the expected value of the sanction equal to the expected harm from the 
activity.  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. 169 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff 
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Review. 880 (1979). 
26 Shavell, supra note __. 
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engage in the activity in question.  Examples of command-and-control 
regulation include various types of environmental rules, the regulation of 
automobile design safety, as well as the regulation of medical technology 
(including drugs and medical devices).  Command-and-control 
regulation in the U.S. often entails the participation by the regulated 
parties in the process of administrative rulemaking and thus in the design 
and selection of particular regulations.  Ultimately, however, it is the 
regulatory authority (legislature or agency) who must decide ex ante 
(again, before the harm occurs) what activities will be permitted and 
what safety precautions will be taken to minimize harms.   
 
Another type of ex ante regulation is a Pigovian tax.  The 
paradigmatic Pigovian tax is imposed up front: when the risky or harm-
causing activity is engaged in but before the harm associated with the 
activity is fully realized.  One example is the economists’ preferred 
solution to global warming: the carbon-based tax.27  Such a tax would in 
theory be collected at the point of production (or, somewhat less 
efficiently, at the point of sale to consumers), but in any event – with 
almost every proposal for a carbon tax I have seen – the tax would be 
collected before the actual harm to the environment takes place.28  The 
amount of the tax would be based on an ex ante estimate of the external 
environmental harm that a given unit of carbon would contribute.29  
Presumably, the tax would be adjusted as the environment improves (or 
worsens) or as scientists revise their estimates of the effect of carbon on 
the atmosphere and on overall welfare.   
 
In sum, tort law can be distinguished from non-tort regulation in 
terms of who the regulator is (court rather than agency) and in terms of 
the timing of the regulatory in-put (ex post rather than ex ante).30  It 
                                                 
27 James Poterba, Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On the Designing a Carbon 
Tax, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES (200?) (Dorbusch, Rudiger 
& James M. Poterba, eds.). 
28 At least one commentator has suggested using tort law as a sort of ex post carbon-
based judicially imposed tax.  Jonathon Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: 
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1827 (2008). 
29 Gilbert E. Metcalf and David A. Weisbach, Design of a Carbon Tax (January 8, 
2009), U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 447; U of Chicago, 
Public Law Working Paper No. 254. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324854.  
30 The ex ante/ex post distinction between command-and-control regulation and tort law 
is somewhat overstated in the text.  In fact, although many of the most important 
command-and-control regulatory decisions occur before any actual harm occurs from 
the activity in question (as with pre-market approval for certain types of products or 
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should also be noted, however, that negligence and strict liability each 
have their agency-based ex ante equivalent.  That is to say, a fault-based 
tort regime can be understood as an ex post version of command-and-
control regulation implemented through the court system, one that is 
initiated or triggered by those who have been harmed. And a strict 
liability tort regime can be understood as a particular type of ex post 
Pigovian tax.   
 
Given the preceding analysis, it makes sense that there would be 
a standard normative framework for evaluating alternative regulatory 
tools, including tort law, and for deciding which tool is most efficient for 
which situation.  And there is.31  Thus, ex ante agency-based regulation 
is considered preferable to ex post tort liability when the regulatory 
agency is thought to have superior (or cheaper access to) information 
regarding the risks of the regulated activity than does the regulated party 
and when there are concerns about insolvent or judgment proof 
injurers.32  Alternatively, ex post tort liability may be preferable when 
judgment-proofness is not an issue and when potential injurers have 
better ex ante information about the potential harms than do the 
regulators.  And so the argument goes.   
 
Criminal Law and other Non-Monetary Sanctions   
 
Note that if the risky activity in question has a socially optimal 
level of zero (that is, the activity should simply be banned), then the 
efficient penalty under the traditional economic analysis would be large 
                                                                                                                       
product-safety innovations), it is not as if, once the agency has approved the 
activity/product, it can never revisit its decision or make adjustments to take into 
account new information, including information about actual post-approval loss 
experience.  But many agencies are notoriously bad at acting aggressively on new 
negative information regarding previously approved activities, which is part of the 
reason that the tort suits arise, of course.  This suggests, however, that the ex post/ex 
ante distinction does capture something of continuing significance in the world. 
31 Donald Wittman & Michelle White, A Comparison of Regulation and Liability Rules 
Under Imperfect Information, J. Legal Stud. (1983); Shavell, supra note __; Charles D. 
Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm versus Ex 
Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 888 (1990).  
For a more recent application of this framework within the economic literature, see 
Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, Litigation and Regulation (Feb. 19, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript, available online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344505).  
32 Ex post regulation works only if the regulated party anticipates having sufficient 
assets to pay the full harm caused by its activity ex post.  Shavell, supra. 
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– large enough to fully deter the activity in question at the lowest 
administrative cost.33  This analysis suggests that this extreme sort of 
deterrence is one role for the criminal law:  to identify behavior whose 
optimal activity level is zero and then, at the lowest administrative costs 
possible, deter the behavior completely – or come as close as reasonably 
possible to doing so.  Consider, for example, intentionally caused harms.  
These are considered socially undesirable, either on intrinsic grounds or 
because they are thought to undermine social-welfare maximization; and 
therefore those who cause intentional harms face the prospect of criminal 
sanction, in addition to potential tort liability.  Of course, even if the 
ideal level of some activity is zero, the administrative costs necessary to 
achieve that ideal may not be cost-justified.  Put differently, given the 
administrative/enforcement costs associated with any regulatory or law 
enforcement regime, the truly (all-things-considered) optimal level of 
even socially undesirable activities may be positive.  This is the familiar 
point that, in a sense, the globally optimal level of crime – given 
enforcement costs (and given human nature) – is probably not zero. 
 
I should also point out another standard conclusion in the L&E 
deterrence literature: that criminal sanctions will not always be the most 
efficient way to deter even clearly undesirable behavior.  This is true for 
a bunch of reasons, but let’s focus on one:  Insofar as criminal sanctions 
involve non-monetary sanctions (again: prison), such sanctions are 
inherently less efficient than monetary sanctions – not because prisons 
are more costly to run than are systems of monetary transfers (though 
that is almost certainly true most of the time), but because there is a 
fundamental theoretical asymmetry between monetary sanction and non-
monetary sanctions.  This asymmetry is that monetary sanctions involve 
transfers whereas non-monetary sanctions generally do not.34  Thus, 
when a criminal spends time in jail and is deprived of his liberty and his 
ability to produce income, it causes him to experience a reduction in 
utility, which is the source of the desired deterrent effect.   
 
A monetary sanction that reduces the criminal’s utility by the 
same amount in theory has the same deterrent effect.  The difference is 
that with the monetary sanction there is also a commensurate increase in 
someone else’s utility, whoever enjoys the benefit of the cash transfer.  
                                                 
33 This is how economists tend to understand the line between what behaviors are 
criminalized and which are not.  See, e.g., Becker, supra note, __; Shavell, supra note 
__; and Polinsky, supra note __. 
34 Becker, supra note __.   
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For example, although tort damages lower the injurer’s utility (that’s 
what makes them a sanction), they also increase the money available to 
the victim (or to her first-party insurer if it is a subrogation suit).  A 
similar point could be made about Pigovian taxes or government fines 
generally:  Because they are transfers, they do not entail any necessary 
net loss of utility, as the tax dollars can be spent on something.  With a 
non-monetary sanction, however, there is no necessary offsetting benefit 
to anyone else in society – other than the deterrence effect itself.  Hence, 
the general preference among economists for monetary sanctions over 
non-monetary sanctions, such as a jail sentence.35   
     
Of course, monetary sanctions are not always feasible.  Indeed, 
that conclusion serves as the basis for the standard economic argument 
for the all-things-considered second-best efficiency of non-monetary 
sanctions in some settings.  For example, if a potential injurer is 
judgment proof, the argument goes, non-monetary sanctions may be the 
only, or the least-cost, way to provide optimal deterrence.  This is the 
standard economic account for why we need criminal penalties other 
than mere monetary sanctions.36  Along the same lines, for many types 
of relatively minor but incredibly numerous offenses, it would obviously 
be too costly to involve the legal system.  Instead, society regulates such 
everyday behavior with non-legal norms that are backed up by informal 
non-transfer sanctions.  Sometimes those sanctions are external, imposed 
by the relevant community; other times – when the social norms have, by 
nature or nurture, been “internalized” by the parties – the sanctions are 
internal in the form of guilt or shame.  
 
These conclusions regarding non-monetary sanctions, among the 
most basic points in the standard economic deterrence theory, have been 
made clearly and repeatedly with respect to criminal sanctions in 
particular.37  Interestingly, however, the very same point could be made 
(but never is) about most informal non-legal sanctions.  That is, in the 
                                                 
35 This analysis also assumes that there are no third-party “psychic benefits” enjoyed by 
those who get pleasure from knowing that criminals are languishing in prison, or at 
least knowing that they are not roaming the streets.  It also ignores any intrinsic value 
society might place on punishing criminals for wrongdoing.  As discussed more fully in 
Part V below, this assumption has implications for how systems of non-monetary 
sanctions should be coordinated with tort law. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 409 (1980) (arguing for replacing jail sentences with criminal fines when 
feasible). 
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large L&E literature on social norms and informal sanctions as an 
alternative to legal rules and formal sanctions, nothing is said about the 
fact that most informal sanctions have the same inherent efficiency 
drawback as criminal sanctions: in that informal sanctions are, for the 
most part, non-transfer sanctions.  So, when scholars writing about the 
efficiency (or lack of efficiency) of social norms, the sanctions they 
generally have in mind are such things as loss of reputation, public 
shaming or humiliation, or perhaps ostracism from the community – all 
non-transfer sanctions.38  But the scholars do not talk about the fact that 
such sanctions are, in this one arguably narrow respect, inferior to 
transfer sanctions (in the very same way that jail sentences are inferior to 
fines), and for the same deadweight-loss reason.39  I will have more to 
say on this subject in Part V. 
 
 The Benefits of Regulatory Coordination   
 
If we think of tort law as a system of regulation, we can compare 
it with other regulatory approaches, including command-and-control and 
Pigovian ex ante regulation.  Further, insofar as the criminal law and 
informal social norms have the effect of altering ex ante incentives, those 
“systems of regulation” (if we can call them that) should also be taken 
into account as well.  More generally, given that different regulatory 
approaches have different strengths and weaknesses in different 
situations, the social planner who is seeking to minimize overall social 
costs and while maximizing overall social benefits should in theory 
design a overarching regulatory strategy that takes all of these various 
factors into account.   
 
                                                 
38 Of course, in some cases, informal social sanctions will have the quality of a transfer.  
For example, when one firm suffers a loss of profits due to its loss of reputation in the 
community for the breaching some social norm, if other firms in the same business then 
experience a commensurate increase in profits (because of the shift in customers from 
the sanctioned firm), then the reputational sanction is essentially the same as a fine, in 
the sense of creating no necessary social waste.  Of course, the incidence of this sort of 
fine will likely be different from that of tort damages or of a Pigovian tax, but that is a 
different issue.  The one article I have found that discusses the possibility that informal 
social sanctions might have fine-line qualities is Cooter & Porat, which I discuss at 
some length below.   
39 Indeed, just as Judge Posner argues for using criminal fines to replace jail sentences 
(in situations in which the judgment-proofness of the criminals does not make fines 
ineffectual), one could argue for substituting transfer sanctions for non-legal informal 
sanctions when possible.     
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For example, we might imagine that, for a given type of risky 
activity, the optimal regulatory regime would include all of the 
following:  (a) agency-based command-and-control regulations requiring 
some minimal safety measures that are efficient for all potential injurers 
engaged in this type of activity; (b) an additional ex ante Pigovian tax 
that represents the agency’s best estimate of the residual risk of the 
unpreventable harm likely to be caused by the activity; (c) ex post strict 
tort liability for the actual harm caused to particular injured parties (with 
an offset for the amount of the ex ante Pigovian tax already paid by the 
manufacturer); and (d) criminal responsibility if a regulated party 
actually intentionally violates the command-and-control regulations or in 
some other way causes in intentional harm.  I do not mean to suggest that 
this is necessarily the best mix of regulatory approaches; it is just one 
possibility.  The point here is only that it clearly makes sense to have 
some sort of regulatory coordination so as to take advantage of the 
strengths of the different approaches, to avoid over-deterrence, and to 
minimize the overall administrative costs of the system.  Ideally, such 
coordination would come from the legislature or from an agency that has 
been delegated this role by the legislature. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this Article will take a 
somewhat different approach.  Rather than take the position of a 
legislature or agency seeking to achieve optimal regulatory coordination 
by manipulating a range of regulatory tools, I adopt here a tort-centric 
perspective:  that is, the perspective of tort lawmakers (whether common 
law court or tort-reformist legislature) that are trying to develop a set of 
principles that rationally coordinate existing (assumed to be fixed) non-
tort regulatory rules with tort law so as to achieve the overall goal of 
creating optimal ex ante risk-reduction incentives at the lowest possible 
administrative costs.40  In the next two Parts, I use the example of two 
particular overlapping regulatory instruments to sketch the basic 
normative framework of the piece.  The two instruments that require 
coordination are tort law (where the operative liability rule is assumed to 
be negligence) and command-and-control agency-based regulation.  I 
begin with these two regulatory instruments in part because one has to 
start somewhere, but also because it is this particular coordination issue 
that courts are actually (and currently) trying to figure out.  To simplify 
                                                 
40 Do I think this is what tort courts are actually doing?  One can certainly find language 
in published tort opinions expressly adopting a deterrence or regulatory type of 
framework, especially in products liability cases.  However, one can also find language 
suggesting that other considerations, such as corrective justice, are also at work. 
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the analysis, I assume in Parts III and IV that the only deterrence variable 
is potential-injurer care levels.  In part V, I reintroduce the activity-level 
variable and consider other tort/regulatory coordination problems, 
specifically those involving criminal law and social norms.  
 
III. Tort Law and Overlapping Command-and-Control Regulation 
 
Fully Optimizing Command-and-Control Regulation : Absolute 
Displacement 
 
We begin this Part with a rather extreme example.  Imagine a 
hypothetical in which tort law must coordinate with a command-and-
control regulatory regime that is “fully optimizing” in the sense that it 
gives potential injurers the ex ante incentive to take all cost-justified 
steps to minimize third-party harms.  Put differently, the regulatory 
agency in question is able to identify (with perfect accuracy) the 
specifically efficient (or “precisely efficient”) level of safety investment 
for each regulated party – not just the “efficient floor” (in the sense of 
the minimal level of safety investment that should be required of all 
regulated parties) or the “efficient ceiling” (in the sense of the maximum 
level of safety above which no regulated party should invest, or be 
required to invest).41 
 
These concepts can best be explained through a series of simple 
examples.  Suppose there is a class of potential injurers who engage in an 
activity that the regulator has determined poses a 1 in 1000 chance of 
causing a $100,000 harm to some third-party victim.  Assume also that 
there is a $30 precaution that each potential injurer could take that would 
                                                 
41 I am using the terms “floor” and “ceiling” in similarly idiosyncratic way.  In the 
preemption literature, these terms refer usually to the limits imposed on state 
regulations that overlap with federal regulations.  On this view, a federal regulatory 
floor would prevent a state regulator (legislature, court, whatever) from permitting the 
regulated party to invest less than the federally mandated minimal level of care.  
Likewise on this view, a federal regulatory ceiling would prevent the state regulator 
from requiring the regulated party to invest in level of care that is higher than the 
federally mandated maximal level of care.  And I sometimes use the terms floor and 
ceiling this way; however, I also use them to refer to the requirements imposed by the 
regulator (whether that regulator is a federal or state agency) on the regulated parties 
themselves.  Thus, if a given regulatory standard (whether adopted at the state or federal 
level, whether a legal rule or an informal norm) were to require that all regulated parties 
invest in some minimal level of safety, I would call such a requirement a regulatory 
floor.  And if the regulatory standard set a cap on how much the regulated party is 
allowed to invest in safety precautions, that would be a ceiling. 
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completely eliminate this $100 risk.  (This $30 safety investment could 
be a particular safety feature on, say, a motor vehicle or medical device; 
or it could be a more detailed or sophisticated warning label for a 
particular consumer product).  And assume that there is no other 
precaution that could be taken that would produce a cost-justified 
reduction in expected harms.  Under these assumptions, then, the $30 
precaution represents the precisely efficient level of care on the part of 
the potential injurers; all regulated parties should take this, and only this, 
level of care; it is both the efficient floor and the efficient ceiling of care.  
If they spend less or more than this on safety, they are wasting 
resources.42   
 
Given all of these assumptions, the efficient command-and-
control regulatory response would be for the regulator simply to require 
all potential injurers to make the $30 safety investment to be allowed to 
engage in the activity.   That is, unless this safety investment was made, 
the activity would be banned.  The regulator would then back up this 
command-and-control requirement with a threatened sanction, something 
that was (in terms of disutility to the potential injurer) enough to induce 
the potential injurer to make the obviously efficient safety investment.  
In this example, any sanction imposing a cost greater than $30 would do 
the trick.   
 
Again, this non-tort command-and-control regulatory regime 
fully optimizes potential injurer care levels under the assumptions of the 
example.  Given that fact, what regulatory role should tort law play?  
The answer is none.  Tort law as a regulatory regime here would be 
redundant, in which case there is no need to incur the famously high 
administrative costs of running the tort system.  Put differently, if 
deterrence is already being handled efficiently by some non-tort 
regulatory regime, then, under the economic view of tort law, there is no 
need to allow tort causes of action in those cases.  Does this mean that I 
am arguing for the elimination of tort law?  Of course not.  The 
conclusion one should draw from this analysis depends on one’s view of 
the various assumptions in particular contexts – the assumptions of the 
                                                 
42 The analysis in the text assumes that the benefit of the activity to the potential injurer 
is greater than $30; otherwise, the activity would simply be banned.  It also assumes 
that this benefit is not affected by the investment (or non-investment) in the $30 safety 
precaution.  Note also that, if due care is taken in this case, there are no activity level 
issues, as I have assumed there is no residual risk associated with the activity.  Activity-
level issues are taken up in Part V below.  
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fully optimizing nature of the non-tort system of deterrence, for example.  
As discussed in greater detail below, if the regulatory regime is less than 
fully optimizing, tort law should play an important deterrence/regulatory 
role.43   
 
But again, at least in theory (and perhaps occasionally in 
practice), when there is fully optimizing agency-based ex ante safety 
regulation (and the various assumptions of the analysis apply), the fact 
that tort law may be redundant of already existing non-tort regulation 
should not be ignored.  And just to be clear, the concern in this idealized 
example is not with excessive deterrence per se.  Assuming both 
standards are set and applied optimally, we would not be worried that a 
C&C regulatory regime and an overlapping negligence standard in tort 
would lead to excessive investment in care by the regulated parties.  If 
we assume that courts and agencies both reach roughly the same 
conclusion in terms of what level of safety investment would be optimal 
for the regulated parties (and they both get this determination roughly 
right), then imposing a negligence regime on top of the ex ante 
command-and-control regulation would produce the same optimal ex 
ante investment in safety as would either of those regulatory instruments 
by themselves.  If tort law, for example, threatens to impose damages of, 
say, $100,000 if the injurer failed to make the $30 safety investment and 
the harm occurred, and the agency threatened  to impose a fine of $100 if 
the same safety investment were not made, what would happen?  The 
potential injurer would indeed spend the $30, but no more than that.  
This is just the nature of a discontinuous – all-or-nothing – regulatory 
standard such as negligence.44  The problem in the example, then, is not 
over-deterrence but the duplicative and unnecessary administrative costs 
                                                 
43 Although beyond the scope of the current analysis, my own view is that in many 
contexts (including many contexts involving consumer product safety regulation), non-
tort safety regulation is far from fully optimizing and tort law should play an important 
regulatory function.  For an argument that enterprise liability can be an efficient form of 
product market regulation, for example, see Hanson & Logue (1990). 
44 Just as the all-or-nothing trigger within negligence law is the concept of “due care” 
(either the potential injurer has taken due care and is therefore immune from liability or 
she has not and is not), the all-or-nothing trigger within command-and-control 
regulation tends to be something like the pre-market approval process for a new drug or 
new medical device under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.  Either the drug/device 
is approved, or it is not. 
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of the two systems, costs for which there would be no offsetting 
deterrence benefit.45   
 
At this point, it bears reminding that we are assuming no 
compensatory or corrective justice role for tort law.  For those 
commentators, policymakers, judges (and readers of this Article) who do 
not accept that assumption, these administrative expenses may be worth 
the cost.  Indeed, if corrective justice through tort law is something 
society cares about, then the administrative costs of running the tort 
system in this example are not duplicative at all.  Rather, they are paying 
for something that the C&C agency regulation is not providing.  
However, if tort law is exclusively about deterrence (cost-
internalization/regulation), such deterrence in this example is being 
accomplished fully by other means.  Therefore, the optimal rule of 
coordination in this case would be one that called for full displacement 
or preemption of tort law.46 
                                                 
45 Overlapping tort sanctions and regulatory sanctions can, of course, produce over-
deterrence, if we change the assumptions a bit.  That is, if we imagine that there is 
potential error in the decisions of courts handling tort cases (perhaps in the 
determination of negligence or in the calculation of damages), then regulated parties – 
potential injurers – may in fact take greater than optimal care.  That is, they may over-
comply or invest too much, more than is cost-justified, in accident prevention in order 
to eliminate the possibility of liability.  On the other hand, the presence of such 
uncertainty also creates an incentive to under-comply, as there is the possibility of the 
court making a mistake in the other direction.  Which effect will dominate depends on 
the situation.  In any event, these effects are present whether or not there is an 
overlapping non-tort sanctioning regime that is already, either fully or partially, 
regulating the conduct in question.  See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, 
Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 
(1984) (showing how uncertainty may influence parties’ incentives to invest in harm 
prevention); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986) (exploring the effects of uncertainty under 
various penalty regimes). 
46 “Displacement” is the term I am using for either when the tort system borrows the 
standard of liability from some non-tort system of regulation (e.g., when it borrows the 
standard of care from a regulation or from custom) or when the tort system declines to 
impose a sanction because of an existing non-tort sanction.   The concept of 
“preemption,” therefore, is a particular type of displacement.  In the legal literature, the 
word preemption generally is used to refer to when there is conflicting federal and state 
law and, owing to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law displaces 
the conflicting state law.  Displacement more generally, however, includes not only 
displacement of state tort law principles by federal law but also of displacement of tort 
law principles by other non-tort regulatory regimes, such as state safety regulations or 
criminal law or even social norms.  Thus, for example, when a state legislature passes a 
law eliminating a class of tort claims in situations in which there has been compliance 
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What would this conclusion look like in practice?  For one thing, 
if the agency regulation (the standards and the enforcement of those 
standards) is fully optimizing, not only should compliance with the 
agency’s promulgated standard displace tort liability, but also non-
compliance with that standard should not give rise to tort liability.  
Indeed, both compliance and non-compliance with the non-tort 
regulatory standard should be considered entirely irrelevant to the torts 
analysis.  I call this extreme scenario, when a non-tort regime completely 
supersedes or displaces the tort regime, “absolute displacement” or “full 
displacement,” meaning that the non-tort regulatory regime displaces tort 
law both in cases of compliance and in cases of non-compliance with the 
non-tort regulatory standard.   
 
Does this sort of absolute displacement exist anywhere in the 
law?  There are areas where Congress has in effect replaced all (or 
almost all) state tort law claims with some other regime of regulation and 
compensation.  Examples include the areas of nuclear energy,47 
childhood vaccines,48 and even 9/11-related claims.49  There are also 
areas in which state legislatures have taken the lead in preempting 
common law tort actions, areas such as workers’ compensation (where 
workplace tort claims against employers have largely been replaced by a 
no-fault insurance regime) and automobile accidents (where a few U.S. 
states have moved in the direction of a no-fault or modified no-fault 
compensation scheme).  In all of these fields, lawmakers have essentially 
eliminated tort law as a system of regulation, and they have done so in 
part because of the existence of some non-tort system of regulation.  For 
example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission imposes strict ex 
ante command-and-control regulatory specifications on all nuclear 
power facilities in the U.S.  The other important common feature of these 
examples is the belief that there already exists, or there will be provided 
as part of the new regulatory regime, an adequate form of direct 
compensation for victims.   
 
I should emphasize that what I am calling absolute displacement 
(i.e., when tort law is completely displaced by a given non-tort 
                                                                                                                       
with relevant federal safety standards, that would be displacing of tort law in the sense 
in which I am using the term.       
47 Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act. 
48 The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 
49 September 11 Victim Compensation Act. 
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regulatory regime such that tort remedies are not available) would be 
efficient only if two conditions are simultaneously present:  first, the 
non-tort regulator must set a standard of care that is precisely efficient 
for all regulated parties; second, the regulator must have in place an 
effective means of monitoring and enforcing those standards.  The 
second part of this formula can raise its own special issues.  Not only 
must the regulator be able to deal with unintentional noncompliance (i.e., 
regulated parties who, in good faith, believe they are in compliance with 
the standards but, in the regulator’s view, are not);50 the regulator must 
also deal with intentional noncompliance.  For example, the regulator 
must be able to detect and punish parties who are engaging in an 
unregulated black-market version of a regulated activity.  These parties 
are simply bypassing the regulatory process and hoping to elude 
detection.   In addition, a fully optimizing regulatory regime must be able 
to deal with parties who do procure regulatory approval but who do so 
through the use of fraud or deceit.  In both types of non-compliance, a 
fully-optimizing regulator would have the ability to detect the 
wrongdoing and, through the threat of monetary sanctions and criminal 
penalties, deter it.   
   
 
Partially Optimizing Regulation   
 
If the existence of a fully optimizing – i.e., precisely efficient, 
fully enforced – non-tort system of regulation would mean that tort law 
should be fully displaced, when should tort law still play a 
deterrence/cost-internalization role, even when there is a pre-existing 
non-tort regulatory regime that applies to the activity in question?  The 
answer is straightforward, at least in theory:  whenever the existing non-
tort system of regulation is only partially optimizing, in either of two 
senses.  First, partially optimizing can mean that the non-tort regulatory 
standard (e.g., the care level being enforced by the agency) is only 
minimally efficient, in that it calls for only that investment in risk-
reduction that all potential injurers engaged in the activity should make, 
but that may not be sufficient for some subset of potential injurers.  This 
is what is sometimes meant by the term “efficient floor.”  Second, 
partially efficient could mean that the regulatory standard (or care level) 
is precisely efficient (both floor-and-ceiling efficient, as defined above), 
                                                 
50 Noncompliance of this sort can result when there is substantive uncertainty as to 
precisely how the regulatory standard should be applied to a given party’s particular 
situation.   
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but is not optimally enforced by the regulator.51  The following sections 
discuss how tort law should be, and in some cases may already be, 
coordinated with these two types of partially optimizing regulatory 
regimes.     
 
Minimally Efficient Regulatory Standards: No Displacement 
 
 Using the example from above, consider the following picture of 
what a minimally efficient regulatory standard might look like and how 
tort law might coordinate with such a standard.  Imagine that there is a 
$5 investment that all potential injurers (i.e., all parties engaged in the 
risky activity) could make that would reduce the expected harm 
associated with the activity by $20.  (Say it would reduce the probability 
of the $100,000 harm from .001 to .0008.)  For some subset of potential 
injurers, however, assume that an additional $25 investment should also 
be made because that additional investment would reduce the risk even 
further, from an expected harm of $80 to zero (from probability .008 to 
nothing).  For those potential injurers, $30 is the precisely efficient level 
of investment in care.  For the remaining potential injurers, it would cost 
more than $80 to eliminate the residual $80 risk; thus, for them, $5 is the 
precisely efficient level of care.  Let us also assume that, although the 
agency regulator can identify ex ante the general class of potential 
injurers, it cannot distinguish the $30-efficient-care folks from the $5-
efficient-care folks.  As a result, the best the regulator can do is require 
all potential injurers to make the $5 safety expenditure and leave the 
courts (applying a negligence analysis ex post) to determine which 
injurers should have made the additional $25 investment. 
 
                                                 
51 It is also theoretically possible that the federal regulator could set an efficient ceiling 
only, in the sense of establishing a standard of care that regulated parties are not 
allowed to exceed and that state regulators, including state tort law qua regulation, may 
not require the regulated parties to exceed.  Such a ceiling might make sense if 
additional expenditures on enhanced safety beyond the ceiling were clearly socially 
wasteful, perhaps because they substantially undermined the value of the regulated 
activity.  An example would be where requiring manufacturers of a given product to 
include an especially expensive safety feature that made the device essentially unusable 
for its designed function or too costly for anyone to afford.  Because the standard would 
be a ceiling only, however, investing less in safety than the ceiling provides would 
presumably not be considered noncompliance with the standard.  Thus, so long as the 
regulated party invested less than the maximal amount, there could still be room for a 
negligence suit.  If, however, if the regulated party made the maximally efficient 
investment (invested up to the ceiling), state tort claims would be preempted.   
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Examples of this sort of minimally efficient safety investment are 
easy to imagine.  For example, the Department of Transportation might 
determine that the benefits exceed the costs for all cars and trucks be 
equipped with frontal airbags, which therefore could be made a minimal 
requirement for all cars and trucks.  However, it might be determined 
that the overall efficiency of passenger-side airbags depends on a number 
of factors that are better left open to the discretion of the auto-makers but 
subject to the after-the-fact regulation of potential products liability suits 
against auto manufacturers.  Likewise, we might imagine a similar sort 
of story applying to labeling requirements for prescription drugs: certain 
minimally informative labels might be required, leaving the possibility of 
additional warnings to the interplay of the marketplace and the tort 
system.52 
 
This scenario, then, obviously anticipates an important 
complementary ex post deterrence role for tort law.  In such cases, 
although the agency regulation may give all potential injurers the 
incentive to make the minimally efficient care-level investments, only 
the threat of ex post tort liability would induce the low-avoidance-cost 
potential injurers to make that efficient additional $25 safety investment. 
Thus, compliance with a minimally efficient regulatory standard of care 
should clearly not, from regulatory perspective, be preemptive of state 
tort law claims.   
 
This conclusion, again, depends on a number of key assumptions.  
For example, the analysis assumes not only that courts can recognize 
when the universe of potential injurers potential injurers but also, 
critically, that courts can, in their ex post negligence analysis, accurately 
sort the $5- from the $30-efficient-care injurers, in a way that the agency 
cannot ex ante.  In addition, as with the economic analysis of torts 
generally, this conclusion assumes that potential injurers themselves are 
perfectly informed and perfectly rational. What that means in this 
context is that potential injurers themselves can figure out ex ante which 
category they fall into (the $5 care-level category or the $30 care-level 
category) and that they believe that if they under-invest in safety (spend 
$5 when they should spend $30) they will, in the event of an injury, be 
held liable ex post by a court for the full harm they cause.  If these 
assumptions do not hold, tort law cannot be assumed to have a beneficial 
                                                 
52 One special concern with warnings, of course, is the problem of warning overload.  If 
a warning label contains too many listed hazards, the effect can be to overwhelm the 
intended audience and even to cause them to ignore the warnings altogether.  
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ex ante deterrence effect on care levels.  If these assumptions do hold, 
then the threat of such complementary tort liability will give potential 
injurers the overall efficient ex ante care-level incentives – and with no 
problems of redundant sanctions.53      
 
As most lawyers will recognize, the common law of tort actually 
has a tort doctrine that is roughly (or at least potentially) consistent with 
the conclusion that regulatory compliance should not be displacing (or 
preemptive) of tort law in this setting.  According to the Third 
Restatement of Torts, the doctrine of statutory or regulatory compliance 
provides that, although compliance with a statute or regulation is of 
evidentiary value to the question of negligence, it does not preclude a 
finding of negligence in a tort case.54  Thus, assuming of course there is 
no express preemptive language in the relevant statute or regulation, 
regulatory compliance is generally not considered preemptive or 
displacing of a tort law claim under the basic common law doctrine.  A 
similar statement of this soft regulatory compliance principle can be 
found in the Products Liability Restatement.55  Thus, although courts 
generally suggest that regulatory compliance is relevant to the 
negligence question (in the sense that the fact finder is not forbidden 
from taking such regulatory compliance into account), the general rule in 
a majority of states seems to be that the court is free in such cases to 
apply something like the Hand BPL analysis or its equivalent to evaluate 
the efficiency of the care taken by the particular injurer in the suit before 
it.56   
 
                                                 
53 Even if the non-tort regulator has in place sufficient sanctions to induce compliance 
with the minimal standard, allowing the tort system to be a “backup” will not lead to 
excessive care-levels, for the reasons discussed in the previous section:  Potential 
injurers will be induced to take optimal care in order to avoid all possibility of having to 
pay the $100,000 damage awards.  Of course, the conclusion that tort law has an 
important role to play in this type of situation also depends on the size of the universe 
of $30 efficient-care potential injurers.  That is, if in the example in the text, 99 percent 
of potential injurers are $5 potential injurers and only 1 percent $30, the administrative 
cost of having the tort system sort out that 1 percent would probably not be worth the 
candle. 
54 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16 (2005). 
55 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 (1998). 
56 As will be discussed in greater detail below, courts applying the regulatory 
compliance principle will look to legislative intent to determine if there is implied 
preemption.  The point here is that there common law doctrine itself does not, in the 
absence of such implied or expressed legislative intent, treat compliance as preemptive. 
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Is this doctrine in fact being applied by courts in a way that 
optimizes the deterrence goal?  Maybe.  Maybe not.  To answer that 
question would take us well beyond the scope of the current project.  The 
point here is just that there is a tort doctrine on the books that is at least 
consistent with the efficient approach to overlapping tort and non-tort 
sanctions in the context of minimally efficient regulatory standards 
(where the issue is injurer care levels).  
 
Although most states have taken the approach of treating 
regulatory compliance as merely relevant, some states have gone further 
towards favoring the regulatory choices of regulatory agencies over 
common law courts.  Specifically, with respect to product liability claims 
in particular, a number of states have enacted statutes that put a thumb on 
the scale in situations in which there has been compliance with the non-
tort agency-based regulatory standard.  In several states, for example, the 
rule now is that, if a product manufacturer complies with a federal or 
state regulatory standard, there will be a “rebuttable presumption” 
against a finding of negligence or product defect.57  Is this presumption 
welfare enhancing?  If this presumption can easily be overcome by a 
showing that the regulation in question is best understood (or was clearly 
intended by the regulator to be understood) as only an efficient 
minimum, then it may well be an efficient rule, assuming that we have 
some degree of confidence in the ability and willingness of the regulator 
to do the job of identifying efficient minima.  If the presumption is 
difficult to overcome, however, these rules seem likely to be inefficient 
and may well lead to under-deterrence rather than optimal coordination. 
The regulation of many consumer products is notoriously inadequate.58  
And even when federal safety regulation is considered reasonably 
effective, the resulting safety standards are often intended only to be 
efficient minima only.   
 
If compliance with a minimally efficient standard should not be 
preemptive of a tort suit, what about noncompliance with the minimally 
efficient regulatory standard?  If it is certain that the regulatory standard 
                                                 
57 Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-21-403(1)(b) (2007); Ind. Code Ann. §34-20-5-1(2) (West 
1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-3304(a) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §411.310(2) (West 
2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:58C-4 (West 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. §29-28-104 (2007); 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §82.007(a) (Vernon 2005); Utah Code Ann. §78-15-
6(3) (2005). 
58 The Consumer Product Safety Commission is the most obvious example.  Because of 
CPSC’s perennial underfunding and understaffing, it has long been, and still is, 
considered to be largely ineffective in maintaining general consumer product safety. 
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is minimally efficient for all potential injurers (as in the example above), 
and if the court determines that the failure to make the investment in fact 
increased the risk of the harm that is being sued for, there is an argument 
to be made for allowing the court to apply a default rule of negligence 
per se.  NPS would allow the court to avoid the administrative expense 
of a full-blown negligence analysis, with all of the accompanying expert 
testimony and cross-examination of experts and so on.   
 
Negligence per se would make sense in this case not only on 
administrative cost grounds; it may also actually improve potential-
injurer care levels (compared with the full-blown ex post negligence 
analysis).  This could be true if there is a concern that some courts or 
juries, applying their own ex post full-blown negligence analysis, will 
make mistakes – specifically, that they will apply an inefficiently lax 
standard of care that allows the injurer to avoid liability despite failing to 
make even the minimally efficient safety investment.  If such scenarios 
are likely, then the doctrine of negligence per se could contribute directly 
to improving the efficiency of potential-injurer care levels, by ensuring 
that courts at least insist on the minimally efficient $5 investment for all 
potential injurers.   
 
In addition, the negligence per se doctrine might also contribute 
to efficiency by enlisting the tort system to impose additional sanctions 
for failure to meet the minimally efficient standard, when the ex ante 
regulator has limited resources for enforcing its own standards.  In such a 
case, the court acts as an enforcer of the agency’s minimalist regulatory 
standards.59  Thus, if the non-tort regulator determines (correctly) that all 
potential injurers should invest $5 in care, but the regulator does not 
have the resources to enforce this minimal standard, the existence of a 
tort regime applying a NPS doctrine will supplement the regulatory 
incentive to comply with that minimally efficient standard.  They (the 
$5-efficient-care parties) can avoid negligence per se liability merely by 
making the $5 minimal investment, which they will rationally do.  And 
so long as the traditional regulatory compliance doctrine applies (or even 
the new rebuttable regulatory compliance defense), the $30-efficient-care 
parties will still need to make the full $30 investment to avoid liability 
under the full-blown negligence analysis.   
 
                                                 
59 Cross reference discussion infra of preemption cases. 
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If, however, the non-tort agency regulator fully enforces the 
minimally efficient standard (and thus all parties are already induced to 
make the $5 floor investment in care), the NPS doctrine would not be 
needed.  In such a case, the only remaining regulatory task for tort law 
would be to identify the $30-efficient-care individuals and to hold them 
liable for not making the additional $25 investment.  This conclusion 
will be important when we focus on the criminal law in Part IV below. 
 
There is of course an actual doctrine of negligence per se, which 
is roughly consistent with the preceding discussion.  According to the 
Third Restatement of Torts, a finding of an injurer’s non-compliance 
with a statutory or regulatory standard will result in a verdict of 
negligence, provided that the regulatory standard in question was 
designed to protect against the type of accident the injurer’s conduct 
caused, and that the accident victim is within the class of persons the 
statute or regulation was designed to protect.60  Thus, if the example 
above it could be shown that a particular potential injurer failed to spend 
the $5 minimal safety investment, and that that failure created the sort of 
risk that resulted in the harm to the victim in question, the goal of overall 
cost minimization would be served by holding the defendant per se liable 
in tort.  Optimal deterrence would be achieved; and administrative costs 
minimized.  Again, this conclusion turns on some pretty strong 
assumptions not only about the level of competence and commitment of 
the regulatory agency in setting minimally efficient standards for all 
potential injurers, but also about the inability of the regulator to police 
such noncompliance on its own and thus the usefulness of tort liability in 
such cases.61 
Note that there will be times when the injurer’s failure to satisfy 
the regulatory standard should not qualify as negligence per se and 
                                                 
60 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14.  NPS can apply to any statutory or regulatory 
safety-related rule, but it tends to be applied most often in the case of automobile 
accidents, both because of the number of accidents and because of the number and 
importance of the various statutory rules governing driving, such as speed limits, stop 
signs, and the like.  Id. at comment d.  In other fields, where there are far fewer 
statutory or regulatory rules governing the conduct of potential injurers (such as in the 
field of medicine), NPS is a doctrine on which plaintiffs rely far less often.   
61 Michigan has in effect statutorily reversed the common law NPS doctrine in products 
cases (including but not limited to drug cases) by providing that evidence of 
noncompliance with any federal or standard will not create a presumption of 
negligence.  This conclusion is consistent with the view that regulatory agencies should 
be allowed to handle noncompliance with their regulations as they see fit.  Thus, at least 
for products suits against drug makers, the Michigan system amounts to a state-created 
regime of absolute two-way regulatory preemption. 
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should not be conclusive as to the defendant’s negligence.  For example, 
when a court can conclude that the injurer’s noncompliance with the 
statute or regulation in question did not increase the particular risk that 
gave rise to the plaintiff’s harm.  To use the example from the text, 
imagine that the $5 safety investment and $25 safety investment actually 
correspond to risks that are causally unrelated.  Say, for example, that 
the $5 investment eliminates a $20 risk of harm A, and the $25 safety 
investment eliminates a separate $80 risk of harm B.  In such a case, 
failure to make the $5 investment should not constitute negligence per se 
with respect to harm B; indeed, under the assumptions here, the former is 
irrelevant to the latter and should presumably not even be considered on 
the question of negligence with respect to harm B. 
 
Whether courts are in fact applying the NPS doctrine efficiently 
is, again, difficult to say.   But at least there is a doctrine that could be 
used by courts to achieve efficient coordination with existing ex ante 
C&C regulation in circumstances in which the minimal efficiency 
scenario is believed to exist.   
 
Precisely Efficient but Under-Enforced Regulatory Standards: 
Partial Displacement 
 
Another way in which a non-tort regulatory regime can be 
partially optimizing (leaving an important complementary role for tort 
law) would be if the regulatory standard is precisely efficient but under-
enforced, in the following sense:  the standard (a) is both an efficient 
floor and an efficient ceiling of conduct on the part of the regulated party 
(as was the $30 investment for all regulated parties in the original 
example above), but (b) the sanction (or the expected value of the 
sanction) is too low to induce full compliance with that standard.  Think 
of a regulatory agency that has a large research budget for safety 
research, but that has a relatively paltry enforcement budget (and little 
stomach for fining the heck out of non-compliers), such that any 
regulatory scofflaw’s prospect of being sanctioned by the agency is fairly 
small.  Going back to our example, imagine that the regulator determines 
that all potential injurers should make the $30 safety investment, and the 
regulator sets the penalty for failure to comply with the standard at $100.  
However, because of budget constraints, the regulator is able to detect 
only 1 in 100 instances of noncompliance, a fact known by the regulated 
parties.  This reduces the expected penalty to $1, not enough to induce 
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compliance.  How might tort law supplement non-tort regulatory law in 
such a case? 
 
Obviously tort law might provide a helpful supplementary 
sanction in this case.  For those potential injurers who fail to comply 
with the standard, there would be a 1 in 1000 chance of having to pay a 
$100,000 tort damage award.  This threat would be more than enough to 
induce full compliance. What is more interesting, however, is how tort 
law should deal with the question of compliance or non-compliance with 
a precisely efficient but under-enforced regulatory standard.  As it turns 
out, if achieving efficient ex ante incentives is the goal, not only should 
noncompliance with the regulatory standard constitute negligence per se 
(for the reasons already discussed), but compliance with the standard 
should result in a finding of “non-negligence per se.”  In other words, 
when the non-tort regulatory standard is both an efficient floor and 
ceiling but the sanction is inadequate, tort law should still apply in cases 
of non-compliance with the regulatory standard (unlike in the full 
displacement situation described above).  Moreover, to save on 
administrative costs, the non-tort regulatory standard should in effect be 
substituted for the common law court’s own application of the 
negligence standard.62   
 
Summary 
 
Under the framework set out above, when the non-tort regulatory 
regime is fully optimizing – has a precisely efficient standard of care that 
is fully enforced – tort law should be absolutely displaced.  In the case of 
federal non-tort risk regulation, what this means is that tort law in such 
situations should be fully preempted.  When, however, the non-tort 
regime merely sets an efficient minimum standard of care—an efficient 
floor – there should be no displacement (or preemption) of tort law; the 
common law court should apply the doctrine of negligence per se, but 
the court should not treat compliance as decisive on the question non-
negligence.  Finally, when the non-tort regime is partially optimizing in 
                                                 
62 This assumes, of course, that the floor and ceiling is the same – that is, it calls for a 
single, precisely efficient level of care.  It is also possible to imagine a regulatory 
standard that sets a floor and a ceiling that are different.   Using our example, the 
regulator might set a floor of $5 (if everyone should make that level of investment) and 
a ceiling of $30 (as anything above $30 is a waste of resources).  In that case, we would 
have to think of the floor and the ceiling as separate requirements, and each would have 
different implications (in terms of compliance and noncompliance), both of which were 
discussed above. 
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the sense of setting a precisely efficient (floor-and-ceiling) standard of 
care, but one that is not adequately enforced by the agency regulator, tort 
law should deploy both negligence per se and non-negligence per se 
such that compliance and noncompliance with the regulatory standards 
would be wholly decisive of the negligence question in the tort suit.  In 
this third situation, then, non-tort regulatory standards should only be 
partially displacing or preemptive of common law tort claims – i.e., 
when there is full regulatory compliance.63   
 
IV. Examples of Displacement of State Products Liability Claims 
 
State Statutory Displacement of Tort Law 
 
In applying the three different coordination rules set out in the 
previous Part, a critical question is how a court is to decide which is 
appropriate for a given situation.  Sometimes the choice will be easy, if 
only because the legislature has made the choice clear.  If the legislature 
(federal or state) has clearly stated what the coordination principle 
should be, then, barring some unlikely constitutional constraint, that is 
that.  We might call that “express displacement.”64  As mentioned above, 
a number of states have enacted statutes altering the common law rules 
for coordinating tort claims with state and federal product safety 
regulations, creating a sort of rebuttable regulatory compliance defense.  
The Michigan legislature has gone one step further than merely creating 
a presumption in favor of non-negligence in cases of regulatory 
compliance.  In 1996 Michigan became the first and only state to 
immunize drug makers from tort liability in cases in which drug 
manufacturers have complied with FDA standards and are using FDA-
approved labels.  Specifically, if FDA compliance is shown in such a 
case, the drug in question is conclusively assumed not to be defective or 
unreasonably dangerous.65  No other state has gone this far.   
 
If we project an efficiency/cost-minimization rationale on the 
Michigan state legislature, the assumption underlying the statute would 
                                                 
63 Again, one could either imagine common law courts making these coordination 
decisions or, as discussed in the next section, legislatures adopting these coordination 
rules that common law tort courts would be required to apply. 
64 Again I use the term preemption to describe any sort of displacement of state tort 
liability by some non-tort system of deterrence.  Express preemption can also result 
from an agency pronouncement, if the agency is acting within its properly delegated 
authority. 
65 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §600.2946(5) (West 2007). 
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seem to be that FDA regulation of drug manufacturers fits the 
description of the partially optimizing agency regulation that (a) sets a 
floor-and-ceiling (rather than floor only) efficient standard of care but (b) 
that may require some state involvement in the enforcement of that 
precisely efficient standard.  The minimally-efficient-standard 
assumption can be seen in the fact that compliance is considered decisive 
as to non-negligence (non-negligence per se), and non-compliance seems 
to disable the tort-displacing effect of the immunity statute – thus 
making possible the application of negligence per se.  The statute 
preserves some minimal backup enforcement role for tort law, inasmuch 
as it includes exceptions for cases in which the manufacturer committed 
fraud in the regulatory process or if the manufacturer fails to comply 
with the required FDA labeling.  Thus, the Michigan legislature seems to 
have adopted a partial displacement regime. 
 
Whether this means that the Michigan drug liability regime 
promotes efficient deterrence depends on the various assumptions that 
underlie the analysis.  However, if you believe that drug manufacturers 
will be responsive to tort liability qua regulation and are not likely to be 
judgment proof, and you hold the view that the FDA regulation of drugs 
is at best only partially optimizing (either in the efficient-floor sense or 
under-enforced floor-and-ceiling sense), than state legislation adopting 
what amounts to a blanket displacement of tort law as a supplementary 
tool for regulating drug-maker incentives seems highly dubious.  
Interestingly, the Michigan statute seems to regard as irrelevant whether 
Congress or the FDA itself intended a greater (complementary) 
regulatory role for state tort law with respect to drug manufacturers. This 
is the sort of information that, as mentioned above, might be taken into 
account in those states that have adopted only rebuttable presumptions 
against a finding of negligence or product defect rather than outright 
displacement of such claims.  Of course, from the perspective of a court 
applying applicable state and federal law (which is the perspective I have 
generally taken in this Article), there seems to be little discretion in the 
interpretation of the statute.  In Michigan, with respect to the regulation 
of drug manufacturers, tort law has a very minimal role.66 
 
                                                 
66 Of course, Michigan (or any state for that matter) gets to decide the scope of its own 
products liability law, even if that means defining the cause of action in a manner that 
borrows from federal standards.  If Congress wants to guaranty that tort law will be 
uses in every state as a serious form of safety regulation in any particular field, it would 
have to create federal private rights of action. 
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Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims 
 
The most well-known examples of legislative displacement of 
state tort claims, however, come at the federal level; and this sort of 
displacement – better known as preemption – can also be express or 
implied.  Congress, for example, sometimes expressly and specifically 
provides that certain federal safety standards are to be understood as 
preemptive of all state regulation, which has been interpreted to include 
state tort claims.67  An example of this would be FDA regulation of 
medical devices, which regulation the Supreme Court recently held to be 
preemptive of state tort claims.68  More often than not, however, 
Congress prefers to be (or for whatever reason ends up being) unclear 
about its intentions on the tort law coordination/preemption question, 
leaving courts with the task of determining what degree of preemption, if 
any, the legislature meant to impose.  In the absence of clear statutory 
direction on the coordination question, a court hearing a tort case will 
presumably fall back on the sorts of common law doctrines already 
discussed, including the doctrines of negligence per se, regulatory 
compliance, and the like.  In such situations, when courts have some 
discretion in the matter, how should they decide the overlapping-sanction 
coordination issue?   
 
The framework of this Article suggests a tentative answer:  courts 
(at least appellate courts who are given the ultimate task of interpreting 
and implementing the boundaries between common law tort claims and 
non-tort regulatory regimes) should consider the nature of the non-tort 
regulation at issue and whether the goal of efficient deterrence (i.e., 
creating optimal ex ante accident-avoidance incentives at the lowest 
administrative cost) would best be achieved if that regulation is 
understood as an efficient floor or as both an efficient floor and an 
efficient ceiling.  If the regulation in question is an efficient floor only, 
then a conclusion of no displacement – or no preemption – would be 
optimal; and negligence per se should be applied in cases of 
noncompliance.  If, because of the nature of the regulatory process in 
question, the regulation is likely to involve an efficient floor-and-ceiling 
(a precisely efficient standard of care) but additional state-level 
enforcement would be useful, then a symmetrical rule of negligence and 
non-negligence per se would make sense – or one-way 
                                                 
67 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 
U. S. 504 (1992). 
68 Riegel v. Medtronic (USSC 2008).         
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displacement/preemption.  And, of course, if it happens to be a case in 
which federal regulation seems to be fully optimizing, the court could 
reach the full displacement/preemption conclusion, although, again, that 
would be an extreme result and should not be reached lightly.69   
 
Is this approach consistent or inconsistent with prevailing federal 
preemption doctrine, which is often said to entail a “presumption against 
preemption”?70  It depends.  If one holds that view that federal safety 
regulations tend in general to be only minimally efficient at best, and this 
view applies to all federal agencies, then such a presumption may well 
make sense.71  If, however, one believes that at least some agencies some 
of the time produce floor-and-ceiling efficient safety standards, then a 
presumption against preemption in those situations may not make sense, 
unless such a presumption is made easily defeasible by a showing to the 
court (presumably made by a defendant) that the regulatory standard in 
question is precisely efficient.  (This would be the inverse of the 
argument regarding the efficiency of the “rebuttable presumptions” in 
favor of federal preemption created by a number of state legislatures, 
                                                 
69 That is what should be done with implied preemption cases.  What about express 
preemption cases?  Even with cases involving express statutory preemption provisions, 
courts will often have some decision-making discretion when the terms of the 
preemption provisions are not entirely clear on the relevant question.  In such 
situations, courts can, and should, take into account the nature of the regulation in 
question and the regulatory process that produced it, as just described.  This conclusion, 
of course, is limited by the assumptions set out at the beginning of the Article, 
including the assumption of rationally informed regulated parties.  However, at least in 
many of the most high-profile products liability cases, where the regulated parties are 
large automakers or pharmaceutical companies, these assumptions seem entirely 
plausible.   
70 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1985).  Note, however, 
that the presumption against preemption does not always seem to be honored.  See, e.g., 
Geier.  Justice Alito in the Levine case has gone so far as to say that there has never 
been a presumption against preemption in conflict preemption questions.  [See his fn 
14.] 
71 This conclusion ignores other more traditional federalism-type rationales for the 
presumption against preemption.  From the desire to satisfy the potentially disparate 
regulatory preferences of the citizens of different states, to the hope that deferring to 
state and local law would induce democractic participation at the state and local levels, 
to a vision of race-to-the-top competition among 50 separate regulatory laboratories, 
numerous reasons (that are strictly speaking not deterrence reasons) have been given by 
scholars for why federal laws regulating risk should not be interpreted readily to 
displace state laws that do the same thing.   See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A 
Presumption Against Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 709-10 (2008) (reviewing 
arguments and citing relevant literature). 
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discussed above.)  Indeed, depending on how easily the presumption is 
rebutted, there may not be much difference between a presumption 
against preemption and no presumption at all.  The ease with which the 
courts (including most famously the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years) 
have in fact overcome this presumption has led some scholars to argue 
either that there is a presumption in the other direction or that, instead of 
a presumption, the courts are simply applying their own substantive 
preferences.72 
 
A recent Supreme Court case dealing with federal preemption of 
state tort claims illustrates how this analysis might be applied.  Wyeth v. 
Levine,73 decided this term, involved a state law failure-to-warn tort 
claim brought against the maker of the anti-nausea drug Phenergan.  The 
plaintiff was severely injured when the drug was administered to her 
through the so-called IV-Push method, whereby the drug is injected 
directly into a vein, and during that process some of the drug came into 
contact with oxygen-rich arterial blood in the plaintiff’s arm, causing an 
interaction that eventually led to gangrene.  As a result, the plaintiff’s 
arm had to be amputated.  At trial the plaintiff claimed, and the jury 
ultimately agreed, that if the warning on the drug had been more explicit 
about the specific risks of IV-Push administration compared with the 
much safer IV-Drip method, the accident would not have happened.  The 
drug maker argued that the warning did in fact mention the risk of the 
IV-Push method and that, in any event, the claim was impliedly 
preempted since the specific warning had been approved by the FDA.   
 
The Supreme Court did not buy the defendant’s implied 
preemption argument and held instead that presumption against 
preemption led to the opposite result.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
majority included a lengthy discussion of tort law’s history of 
supplementing federal regulation of drug labels and warnings. 
 
In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law 
tort suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law 
as a complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA has 
limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and 
                                                 
72 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1318–24 (2004); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the 
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 429, 471–72 (2002). 
73 Full cite. 
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manufacturers have superior access to information about their 
drugs, especially in the post-marketing phase as new risks 
emerge.  State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and 
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks 
promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that 
may motivate injured persons to come forward with information. 
Failure-to-warn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA’s 
premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary 
responsibility for their drug labeling at all times. Thus, the FDA 
long maintained that state law offers an additional, and 
important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA 
regulation.74 
 
This statement of the Court’s reasoning sounds very much consistent 
with the sort of coordination framework this Article is putting forward: 
that federal regulation of drug labels and warnings sets only minimally 
efficient standards which, in specific cases, might be optimally 
supplemented with additional warnings.  And that tort law is supposed to 
play the role of inducing manufacturers to do adopt the precisely optimal 
warnings that fit the particular situations that arise.  Again, this 
conclusion is obviously consistent with the coordination framework set 
out above.  Whether we can say that it is the right conclusion in this 
particular case, however, would depend on a close reading of the specific 
facts of the case.75 
 
What about Non-Compliance with Regulatory Standards? 
 
In the cases just discussed, and in most cases involving claims of 
federal preemption of state tort claims, the defendants in question have 
complied with the federal regulatory standards.  What about cases of 
                                                 
74 Id. at __. 
75 The presence of a dissenting opinion in the case suggests, of course, that reasonable 
people can disagree on how the case should be resolved.   The Levine Dissent’s primary 
argument is that the FDA in this case seems to have concluded that the warnings/labels 
that were authorized were sufficient to get the job done – in the sense of being both an 
efficient floor and an efficient ceiling.  To support this conclusion, the Dissent was at 
pains to document the amount of time and effort the agency put into approving the 
particular warnings that were used in this case; and the opinion observes that the 
manufacturer had even suggested a more stringent warning several years back, which 
had been rejected by the Agency.  The Majority gives a great deal of weight to the trial 
court’s finding that that the Agency never gave more than “passing attention” the issue 
of IV-Push versus IV-Drip administration of the drug.  I provide a fuller discussion of 
the details of Levine case and its significance for products liability law elsewhere.  See 
Kyle D. Logue, Federal Preemption and the Purpose of Tort Law (working paper). 
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non-compliance?   Specifically, what has the Supreme Court said about 
federal preemption in situations in which there has been non-compliance 
by the tort defendant with federal regulatory standards?  Frankly, such 
cases rarely reach the Supreme Court, presumably because it is 
considered uncontroversial that non-compliance with federal regulatory 
standards negates federal preemption.  There has certainly been a fair 
amount of explicit dicta to that effect.  The Court has often stated that 
parallel state-based products liability claims should not be preempted, so 
long as the state-based duties that are alleged to be violated merely 
parallel (and do not add to) federal duties.76  Thus, the Court seems to be 
saying that non-compliance with FDA standards should disable any 
preemptive effect of the otherwise preemptive regulations and that, if 
states want to supplement the federal enforcement of FDA regulations 
with parallel state-law enforcement, that is just fine.   What’s more, 
although none of the Supreme Court cases that discuss the possibility of 
such parallel claims mention the doctrine of negligence per se, 
presumably that doctrine, in the event of manufacturer’s noncompliance 
with FDA requirements, would also not be preempted.   
 
Why, as an efficiency matter, would such parallel common-law 
tort claims, whether as negligence per se claims or product defect claims, 
be exempt from preemption, given the presence of rigorous FDA 
regulation?  Again, applying the framework from the previous Part, it 
could be that the Court views the agency as being competent at setting 
standards but in need of help with regard to enforcing those standards.  
(The quote above from Levine certainly has language to that effect.)  
Alternatively, it may be that the Court, in deciding the circumstances 
under which federal regulations will preempt state tort claims, is 
influenced by a corrective justice conception of tort law, or by a sort of 
blended corrective justice/regulatory view.  There is evidence for both of 
these views within the Court’s various tort-preemption opinions.  One 
lesson of this Article is that the Court needs to decide on a particular 
conception of the function of tort law, in part because one’s normative 
vision of the function of tort law can have important implications for 
how tort law should be harmonized with other forms of regulation. 
 
 One area of continuing controversy in the tort-preemption field – 
an area that also presents the problem of non-compliant tortfeasors – is 
the problem of the manufacturer who seems to be in compliance with 
                                                 
76 Riegel; Lohr. 
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FDA regulations, but who the plaintiff alleges secured FDA approval 
through fraud.  The Supreme Court has held that tort suits brought 
against such defendants alleging “fraud on the FDA” are preempted, 
because allowing such suits would interfere with agency’s ability and 
discretion to punish such fraud on its own.77  After all, the argument 
goes, the FDA has the power to seek sanctions, including criminal 
penalties, for such fraudulent behavior.  On the one hand, there is a 
strong argument that federal preemption should be disabled (and state 
tort claims allowed to proceed) when the parties have lied to secure 
regulatory approval.   
 
On the other hand, there is something troubling about the 
prospect that any time a manufacturer gets approval from the FDA for a 
new drug or medical device, that manufacturer then has to prepare to 
defend itself against state tort suits in potentially 50 states arguing that 
the FDA’s decision should be annulled due to fraud.78  Moreover, if 
federal criminal penalties for defrauding a federal agency are not enough 
to deter such behavior, what additional benefit will there be from state-
based tort suits?   
 
Professor Catherine Sharkey has suggested a resolution to this 
debate:  Allow preemption to be disabled only by a decision of the FDA 
(or whoever the relevant agency is) that there was fraud in the 
application process.  At that point, once the agency has made the fraud 
finding, the preemption of state-based tort suits would be “turned off.”79  
This strikes me as a reasonable suggestion.  Let the FDA be the judge of 
whether or not there has been adequate and untainted compliance with its 
(the FDA’s) regulations.  Injured victims, or other interested parties, 
could of course bring any available evidence of fraud to the agency’s 
attention, as they would have an incentive to do.  But it would be up to 
the agency to make the fraud determination.  If we allow any old 
common law court hearing a court case to make such a determination, 
then the possibility of redundant regulation is obvious.   
 
                                                 
77 Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).  It remains unclear, 
however, whether that case will be construed as requiring preemption only state claims 
that specifically sound in “fraud on the agency,” or whether it will be interpreted to 
preempt a regular design-defect claim that relies in some way on the fraud of the 
defendant.   
78 Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
841 (2008). 
79 Id. at 841. 
42
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 105 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art105
   42 
 
The only qualification I would add to Sharkey’s conclusion is 
that if it is the case that the agency in question has the resources to police 
fraud in the regulatory process, it may also be the case that the agency 
has the ability also to police and punish fraud in that process as well, in 
which case preemption may still be appropriate.  Perhaps the FDA (or 
whatever agency it is) should, in addition to making the initial fraud 
determination, determine explicitly whether it wishes to be the sole 
enforcer of the rules against fraud in the regulatory process.  Of course, 
there may be reasons to doubt the agency’s objectivity on this question, 
but if that is a concern, we might not want to rely on the agency to make 
the fraud determination in the first place.  
 
V.  Other Issues of Overlapping Sanctions and Coordination with Torts 
 
Overlapping Social Norms or Customs   
 
The law-and-economics literature on social norms treats non-
legal norms and their accompanying informal sanctions as an alternative 
system of regulation.  The basic idea is that norms arise more or less 
organically from within a particular community, and these norms play a 
regulatory role similar to that of legal rules by identifying conduct that is 
considered undesirable and imposing informal sanctions on those who 
engage in this behavior.80 Although the precise nature of these informal 
sanctions usually is left vague in the literature, the quintessential 
example is a loss of reputation within the community, which in turn 
reduces the sanctioned party’s wealth or, more generally, her utility. 
Ideally, actors over time begin to “internalize” social norms such that the 
experience some sort of internal sanction (such as guilt) if they violate 
                                                 
80  As Eric Posner has aptly observed, “[t]he concept of a ‘norm’ is slippery, and 
scholars use it in different ways.”    Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient 
Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1698 (1996).  Although there are numerous different 
definition of norms, Posner’s will do will enough for my purposes:   
A norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable and 
undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to punish a 
person who engages in the undesirable behavior. Thus, a norm 
constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences. I n these 
ways, a norm is like a law, except that a private person sanctions the 
violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a 
law. 
Id. 
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the norm, thus eliminating the need for external enforcement of the 
norms by members of the community.81   
 
Within this literature, it is generally assumed, always implicitly, 
that an informal social sanction will not produce an offsetting gain to 
anyone else, not even the victim of the norm violation.  That is, unlike a 
monetary sanction such as a tax or tort damages, social sanctions (loss of 
reputation or pangs of guilt) do not increase anyone else’s utility.82  If 
that is true, social sanctions have something important in common with 
prison sentences:  the disutility experienced by the sanctioned party is a 
deadweight loss.83  As mentioned in Part II, this is the main reason that 
fines are generally considered by economists to be superior to non-
monetary penalties, assuming fines are feasible.  Of course, norms can 
operate where monetary legal sanctions cannot, when there are problems 
with insolvent injurers, for example.  Also, norms (especially fully 
internalized norms) are cheaper to administer than a regime of pure legal 
sanctions.  Think of all the deterrence/cost-internalization work that is 
continuously done by informal norms (external and internally enforced) 
in the world with respect to everyday behavior.  Now consider how 
unimaginably expensive it would be if there were no social norms to do 
all of that heavy lifting and if everyone was the quintessential Holmseian 
bad man. 
 
Whether a given social norm or custom is efficient (in the 
regulatory sense of optimally incentivizing potential injurers), or under 
what conditions efficiency should be expected, is a much debated issue.  
Some argue that, at least in situations in which the community in 
question is close knit and there are no parties outside of the community 
who are affected by the communities’ behavior, efficient norms or 
                                                 
81 Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000). 
82 One exception is Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal 
Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. Legal Stud. 401 (2001).  Cooter and Porat argue that in 
informal social sanctions will generally produce what amounts to beneficial 
externalities.  For example, they argue that whenever a social sanction is imposed on 
someone who has violated a norm, the fact of enforcement of the norm reinforces the 
norm itself, thus generating a sort of public good.  A conclusion they draw from this 
argument is that tort damages should be offset to the extent of the non-monetary social 
sanctions, similarly to the way that I have argued that strict liability tort damages 
should be reduced to offset the existence of ex ante Pigovian taxes.  See infra note __ 
for further discussion of this issue. 
83 This conclusion of course ignores any psychic benefit that victims might get, or any 
intrinsic retributive value in seeing criminals locked up. 
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customs can emerge.84  In such situations, the evolution of the social 
norm has the structure of iterated Prisoner’s-Dilemma game, from which 
value maximizing solutions can evolve.  Not everyone agrees, however, 
that efficient norms will develop even in close-knit groups: for example, 
if there are spillover effects outside of the group.85  In addition, efficient 
norms can arise in situations other than iterated in Prisoner’s-Dilemma 
game structures.  Steven Hetcher has pointed out, for example, that 
efficient norms or customs can arise to solve coordination problems, 
even without close-knittedness.86  Consider the norm of drivers in a 
particular country all driving on the right-hand side of the road.  This 
norm prevails not primarily because of the threat of informal reputational 
sanctions within the community of drivers, but rather because failing to 
follow the norm once it has taken hold can lead to a serious car accident, 
an outcome that anyone would want to avoid.87  
 
So how should tort law interact, or be coordinated, with such 
social norms/customs?  Before proceeding with the analysis, one caveat 
is in order.  This Article has assumed that the common law court 
deciding a tort case must take all non-tort regulatory regimes as given.  
This is an obviously unrealistic perspective.  A legislature or agency 
might adjust its approach to regulating risky behavior based on what tort 
courts do; and if a court truly wants to maximize social welfare, it would 
need to take such reactions into account.  Still, as a first approximation, 
ignoring such interactive effects makes sense, as such legislative/agency 
adjustments may well never come.  This narrow static perspective is a 
little harder to maintain when the alternative system of regulation is 
social norms.  When a court announces that a given behavior is 
negligent, it may increase the social sanction imposed on that conduct as 
well, assuming people take their cues on such matters from what courts 
say.  Alternatively, if a court decides to impose strict liability on a given 
activity, the community might regard this as a form of ex post taxation 
(as, in effect, charging a price to engage in the behavior in question) and 
                                                 
84 Ellickson, supra note __. 
85 E. Posner, supra. 
86 Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1, 78 (1999).  Indeed, close-knittedness can be a cause of inefficiency, when the 
close-knit group becomes insulating from improvements in knowledge in the larger 
community.  Id. 
87 This particular norm has of course now been incorporated into the law.   The point is 
that even in the absence of legal penalties for driving on the wrong side of the road, 
there would be a large sanction for doing so in the form of the risk of injury to one’s 
self. 
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may therefore regard it as a substitute for social sanctions.  This sort of 
“crowding out” effect has been documented in some experimental 
settings.  Ideally, then, courts hearing tort cases (or lawmakers designing 
tort law) would take such interactive effects into account.  To put it 
mildly, such an evaluation would be challenging.  To avoid complicating 
my own analysis beyond what can reasonably be addressed in a single 
Article, I will ignore such interactive effects. 
 
Back to the question, then:  how best to coordinate tort law with 
overlapping social norms/customs. Part of the argument tracks the 
analysis from Part III above.  If the social-norm/informal-sanction 
regime is fully optimizing, no tort law is necessary.  If it is only partially 
optimizing, then tort law can play a supplemental role.  And if tort law is 
to play a supplemental role, the nature of that role will depend on the 
structure of the norm.  Specifically, it will depend on whether the 
applicable tort rule is negligence or strict liability and on whether the 
norm itself is more like a negligence rule or a strict liability rule.  If the 
applicable liability rule is negligence, and the norm too is akin to an 
informal non-legal negligence standard, a court could then inquire 
whether the standard of care enforced under the norm is efficient and if 
so whether it is merely minimally efficient or floor-and-ceiling efficient.  
If this nonlegal standard is only minimally efficient (and this could be 
demonstrated), then it would save administrative costs to apply 
something like a negligence per se doctrine, whereby failure to comply 
with the custom would be decisive as to negligence.   
 
Likewise if it could be determined that the norm was floor-and-
ceiling efficient (and assuming the social sanction is not fully deterring), 
a rule of negligence per se plus a rule of non-negligence per se might be 
efficient.  In such a situation, non-compliance with the social norm 
should be considered decisive as to negligence and compliance with the 
social norm should be considered fully exculpatory; in both cases, the 
use of the floor-and-ceiling efficient custom would avoid the 
administrative costs of having the court do the full-blown negligence 
analysis.  And again, if it can be demonstrated both that the norm is 
floor-and-ceiling efficient and that the norm is fully enforced through 
informal sanctions (i.e., that the social norm and informal sanctions are 
fully optimizing), then tort law would have no deterrence role.  That is, a 
court might think of custom as displacing state tort law (or not), in much 
the same way that federal regulations sometimes displace or preempt 
state tort law. 
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Does tort law actually follow this pattern?  Not so much.  The 
way in which tort law tends to coordinate with custom in practice is that, 
when there is a relevant custom, compliance and non-compliance are 
considered merely relevant, not decisive.88  Thus, in the existing tort 
doctrine, there is nothing equivalent either to negligence per se or what I 
have called non-negligence per se, as sometimes exists with regulations.  
The framework of this Article would suggest that such doctrines might 
be worth adopting, in situations in which it is possible for courts (or for 
tort-reformist legislatures) to identify non-legal social norms that are 
efficient but that are not already fully enforced through informal 
sanctions.  Moreover, in situations in which it can be shown that social 
norms are fully optimizing, an argument can be made for eliminating tort 
liability as a form of regulation altogether, although such a radical move 
would obviously have to come from a legislative pronouncement. 
 
The preceding discussion assumed that applicable social norm 
was structured like a negligence rule, that the norm called for an 
informal non-monetary (e.g., reputational) sanction only if the injurer 
failed to take something approximating due care.  But what if norms do 
not work that way?  What if social norms are less precise than that and 
instead of making fine-grained determinations of whether the party who 
caused the injury could have efficiently prevented it, the norms simply 
call for some sort of sanction on whoever causes an injury?  That is, 
what if norms act more like strict liability rules?   
 
First, a strict liability social norm would have implications for a 
tort regime that applied a negligence standard, implications that that are 
very different from those associated with the existence of an overlapping 
monetary sanction such as a Pigovian tax.89  If a potential injurer can 
expect to incur a SL non-monetary sanction for causing a given harm to 
some third party, then the negligence standard itself governing that 
conduct (not the damage award) would need to be adjusted upward to 
take account of this additional social cost.  That is to say, the standard of 
care would need to be raised to account for the fact that the activity in 
                                                 
88 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 13.  There are some cases 
that diverge from this general rule.  Specifically, in some cases, divergence from 
custom is considered presumptive negligence, a conclusion that turns out to be difficult 
for the defendant to rebut.  Id. 
89 See the discussion below. 
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question not only poses a risk of harm to some third party victim, but 
also that it poses a risk of harm to the potential injurer herself.   
 
This point is almost identical to an argument made by Robert 
Cooter and Ariel Porat concerning how the negligence standard, 
embodied in the Hand Rule, should be adjusted to account for the risk of 
harm to the potential injurer.90  The point is fairly simple, albeit 
somewhat counterintuitive.  Take the example again of an activity that 
has a 1 in 1000 chance of causing a $100,000 harm to some third-party 
victim, but imagine that it is a risk that can be completely eliminated for 
a given expenditure of care on the part of the potential injurer.  The 
question now is how much of an investment in risk reduction does 
efficiency require?  Put differently, given these numbers, what 
constitutes the optimal level of care?  The answer would depend on a 
number of factors, but given these numbers the maximum efficient 
amount of care on the part of the potential injurer is $100.  Any 
expenditure greater than that, even if it eliminated the risk of harm to the 
third parties, would not be cost-justified.  Now add the assumption that, 
in the event of the accident, not only will the third-party victim be 
harmed, but the injurer herself will suffer a harm of $25,000.  Because 
this harm to the injurer is a social cost as well, it should be taken into 
account, if what we care about is overall cost minimization, which means 
that the maximum level of due care should now be higher – in this 
example, $125.91 
 
What Cooter and Porat did not point out, however, is that, insofar 
as there are strict liability nonmonetary sanctions for a given third-party 
harm (such as the sort of non-monetary reputational sanctions that often 
occur when norms are enforced), such sanctions would have essentially 
the same effect on the calculation of the optimal negligence standard as 
do “harms to self.”  Again, this is because non-monetary sanctions, 
                                                 
90 Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Harm to Self Increase the Care Owed to Others? 
Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. Legal Stud. 19 (2001). 
91 Cooter and Porat therefore suggested that American tort law should be reformed to 
incorporate this insight.  Cooter & Porat, supra note __, at 25 (“By ignoring the effect 
of injurer’s precaution on self-risk, American common law systematically fails to 
analyze accurately the problem of joint risk.”).  Interestingly, the Third Restatement 
seems to adopt Cooter & Porat’s view on this question and even cites their article.  
Restatement, Draft 1, § 3 cmt. b (“In many situations the conduct of the actor imperils 
both the actor and third parties. In such situations, all the risks foreseeably resulting 
from the actor’s conduct are considered in ascertaining whether the actor has exercised 
reasonable care.”) 
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which cause disutility to the injurers and not necessarily offsetting gain 
to the victim, are costs that have to be taken into account in the 
efficiency analysis.  Thus, if the $25,000 in the example above were a 
loss of reputation experienced by the injurer, then the maximal due care 
standard would rise, as in the previous example.  But to whatever extent 
there are nonmonetary sanctions – whether they are external social 
sanctions (reputational) or even internal ones (such as guilt) – that are 
imposed in a sort of strict liability way (that is, automatically upon the 
causing of a third-party harm, with little, or at least not full, mitigation 
for lack of fault on the part of the injurer), such sanctions are obviously 
analogous to physical or emotional harm to oneself; and the same 
Cooter/Porat type of harm-to-self sort of analysis would apply.92   
 
It seems highly likely that some norms do in fact sometimes take 
the form of a strict liability rule, if for no other reason than the problem 
of information costs.  Such costs render a highly accurate version of the 
fault-based alternative impossible.  For example, those who cause harm 
to others in ways that become very public often suffer an instant 
reputational cost that is probably not eliminated, or even much 
diminished, by the fact that the injurer perhaps could not have cost-
justifiably avoided the harm.  If you accidentally hit a pedestrian with 
                                                 
92 There are a number of possible explanations for why Cooter and Porat might have 
left this point out of their analysis.  First, perhaps they were simply not thinking about 
nonlegal sanctions, maybe because their view is that such sanctions are too difficult to 
quantify in the first place.  However, in another article written around the same time as 
the Harm to Self peace, Cooter and Porat wrote explicitly about the question whether 
tort damages should be offset to account for nonlegal sanctions; so they certainly had 
nonlegal sanctions on their minds at the time, and in that piece they seem to be of the 
view that the value of such sanctions could be quantified.  See Cooter & Porat, supra 
note __.  Second, maybe the Cooter and Porat have in mind that social norms tend to 
take the form of a negligence rule rather than a strict liability rule, in which case the 
analysis would be very different.  As discussed in the text, the negligence standard need 
not be adjusted if the non-monetary social sanction will be imposed only in the absence 
of reasonable care; the point is that any excess sanction will just further encourage due 
care, except of course to the extent there is uncertainty in the application of these rules.  
As discussed more below, this explanation seems consistent with the assumptions 
underlying Cooter and Porat’s Nonlegal Sanctions article, which does seem to assume a 
negligence standard is being applied.  Finally, it may be that they omitted nonlegal 
sanctions from their Harm to Self analysis because they view nonlegal sanctions as 
producing beneficial externalities of one sort or another, which makes them more like 
monetary sanctions in the sense that they represent, in effect, a transfer and not a social 
cost.  And indeed this assumption is consistent with assumptions made in their 
Nonlegal Sanctions paper.  Id.  For further elaboration of the implications of the 
difference between monetary and non-monetary sanctions, see Logue, supra note __. 
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your car in such a way as to kill them or cause them serious bodily 
injury, you almost certainly would experience sever guilt and remorse 
and personal anguish, as well as perhaps some loss of reputation in the 
community, even if the accident were not your fault in the strictest sense, 
that is, even if there was no cost-justifiable step you could have taken to 
prevent the accident.   Of course, the guilt and anguish and reputational 
hit would be considerably larger if the crash were the result of your 
recklessness or, worse still, your intentional wrongdoing.  But even if it 
were the result of pure bad luck, there would be some residual 
nonmonetary cost associated with causing severe harm to others.   And 
to that extent, the nonmonetary sanction, internal or external, would have 
an element of strict liability, of harm to self.93 
 
Overlapping Criminal Sanctions 
   
What if the non-tort regulatory regime in place, instead being 
agency-based command-and-control regulation or informal social norms, 
is the criminal law?  That is, if we envision the criminal law itself as a 
tool of risk regulation that tort law must take as fixed, how should tort 
law be adjusted to coordinate with the existence of potential criminal 
sanctions for the same activities to which tort law sanctions often apply?  
The section briefly addresses that question.     
 
First of all, we should not that most criminal standards fit the 
mold of what this Article’s framework would call an efficient minimum, 
in the sense that criminal laws envision a standard of conduct that 
everyone is expected to comply with.  Put in the standard language of 
deterrence, the criminal law prohibits activity whose net social value for 
whatever reason is deemed to be zero.  For example, if we think of 
crimes that easily fall within the category of intentional harms, it is easy 
to see that, but for a narrow set of exceptional cases, it would generally 
be welfare-maximizing for everyone to refrain from violating the 
standard.94  Thus, the law should seek, as cheaply as possible, to deter all 
                                                 
93 Although this is not a question that has been analyzed thoroughly or tested 
empirically, my intuition seems to be shared by others.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law 270 (2007) ("So the law penalizes murder, but not rudeness, 
and negligent injuries but not (in general) injuries that are the result of a pure accident 
even though people feel guilt when they inflict even an unavoidable injury--showing 
there is a norm, though not in general a law, of strict liability for inflicting injury."). 
94 When transaction costs are high (such that the potential injurer is faced with an 
emergency situation and most decide whether to harm someone else’s property or be 
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intentionally caused harms (so long as they do not fall within one of the 
categories of exceptions).    
 
What the framework of this Article suggests that tort law should 
do in such situations is this:  If the criminal law’s minimally efficient 
standard is not fully enforced, in the sense that it does not induce all 
parties to comply with this minimal standard of care, then tort law can 
supplement the sanction with a sanction of its own. In that case, 
efficiency would call for tort liability in all cases of intentional harm, 
perhaps with a threat of punitive damages just to emphasize the point: 
everyone must comply with the minimal standard of not intentionally 
harming others. If, however, the criminal law itself already fully deters 
non-compliance with this minimal standard of care, then tort law need 
not supplement the sanction; and the appropriate coordination rule would 
be: no tort liability for intentionally caused harms.95            
 
Does the law coordinating tort liability with criminal sanctions 
line up with these recommendations?  It’s hard to say.  It depends on 
one’s view of whether existing criminal sanctions are ever fully 
deterring, in the sense of ever providing optimal ex ante incentives to 
comply.  But for the exceptions already mentioned, tort law always 
permits injured victims to recover for intentionally caused harm; and this 
is true even (or perhaps the better word is especially) in those subset of 
cases in which the intentional harm would also qualify as criminal and 
thus subject the injurer to criminal penalties.  Indeed, if there is a 
criminal conviction for the act in question, that conviction will often be 
decisive on the question of intent to cause harm and on the question of 
causation.  Moreover, not only does the common law of torts allow 
injured victims to recover damages for intentional harms, it usually 
allows them to recover punitive damages as well.  If one holds the view 
that the functions of criminal law and tor law are purely regulatory, and 
that the goal of both should be to minimize the costs of harm (including 
the costs of preventing harm as well as administrative costs), do these 
results make sense?   
 
To state the obvious, if it is the case that criminal law is already 
fully deterring of intentionally caused harms, then tort law as a system of 
                                                                                                                       
harmed himself), the law sometimes allows exceptions, using such term as “necessity” 
or “self defense.”  Or so goes the standard L&E story.   
95 This latter conclusion is analogous to the situation discussed in Part II above where 
the ex ante agency regulation fully enforces the $5 minimally efficient standard of care. 
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deterrence/cost-internalization is redundant and wasteful.  Unless it can 
be shown that criminal sanctions are never (ever) fully deterring for any 
activity under any circumstances, it would seem from the economic 
perspective that tort law is never (or almost never) preempted by the 
existence of overlapping criminal sanctions.   
 
There are a number of obvious responses to this conclusion.  
First, it might be argued that criminal sanctions are indeed never fully 
deterring and thus that tort law is always needed as a supplementary 
sanction.  This claim is probably true in many settings, where the 
criminal sanction is woefully under-enforced because of budget 
constraints or political considerations.  But it is difficult to believe that it 
is always true in every context in which criminal sanctions apply.  For 
some criminal offenses, it seems likely that even a remote possibility of 
jail time would likely serve as more than sufficient deterrent.96  Second, 
one might instead argue that criminal law cannot be fully deterring 
because criminals, or parties considering criminal activity, do not act 
rationally.  They simply to do not, in their ex ante decision making, take 
into account the prospect of criminal punishment after the fact.  Whether 
or not this is true, it would be just as valid a critique of tort law as a 
regulatory mechanism and thus does not provide a good explanation for 
why tort sanctions generally should apply alongside criminal sanctions.  
Third, one might argue that imposing an overlapping criminal sanction 
will not produce over-deterrence, because it really is not possible to 
over-deter criminal conduct.  That is, criminal behavior is the sort of 
behavior that society has decided should be prohibited altogether.  And 
imposing tort liability for harm caused as a result of a banned activity 
would simply reinforce the ban; and actors who want to avoid the double 
sanctions need merely honor obey the law.  This is true enough; 
however, there is still the problem of unnecessary administrative 
expenses.  Whenever criminal law is thought to be fully deterring of a 
given type of misbehavior, it does not make sense for society to incur the 
expenses to duplicate the effect via tort law.   
 
                                                 
96 It is important to remember, of course, that the fact that a crime happens does not 
mean that there are not already in place optimal deterrents against such crime.  Unless 
we are willing to devote infinite resources to policing crime, even an optimal criminal 
sanction will not prevent all crime.  This analogous to the point made earlier about 
optimal regulation and tort law:  accidents will happen, even in a world of optimal 
regulation. 
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The most powerful argument against the redundancy of tort law 
in cases of overlapping criminal sanctions contends that neither tort law 
nor criminal law is about deterrence or cost-internalization, or that one is 
but not the other.  Rather, tort law, the argument might go, is about 
corrective justice, and criminal law is about something else – perhaps 
retribution.  Or maybe tort law is about both deterrence and criminal law 
is about retribution – or some other permutation of those options.  The 
point is that the two regimes – tort and criminal law – have two different 
functions that can be fulfilled simultaneously when criminally caused 
harms are allowed to give rise to both criminal sanctions (including 
possibly prison time) and private tort damages.  On this view, it is no 
accident that tort claims are available for criminally (intentionally) 
caused harms; corrective justice and retributive justice tend to go 
together and cut in the same direction, though without being the least 
redundant.  This argument is internally consistent and in some ways 
difficult to refute.  Even if one thinks criminal law is entirely and 
exclusively about retribution, however, if one does hold the view that 
tort law is, at least in part, about deterrence/cost internalization, and if 
there are ever situations in which criminal law is fully deterring of 
certain types of breaches of minimally efficient standards of behavior, 
there is at least a tension created – a potential tradeoff between efficiency 
(and the avoidance of excessive administrative costs) and this goal of 
retribution or whatever else it might be.97  Of course, insofar as a 
criminal conviction resolves all of the difficult factual questions 
presented in a tort case (of causation and fault, for example), then 
securing an overlapping tort judgment – which would in most cases be 
reached via summary judgment – would be relatively cheap in terms of 
administrative costs, even if redundant. 
 
Pigovian Taxes, Strict Liability, and Activity Levels 
 
The analysis in the preceding Parts addressed the problem of how 
to coordinate tort law (specifically negligence-based tort claims) with 
some overlapping non-tort system of regulation – specifically, agency-
based command-and-control regulation or social norms or the criminal 
law.  In this Part, I consider a few other combinations.  First, reconsider 
the possibility of ex ante Pigovian taxes as well as tort law’s ex post 
                                                 
97  One way in which the tort system does coordinate with the criminal system in a 
manner that is consistent with framework of this article is that, insofar as the criminal 
system requires injurers to pay restitution to their victims, such payments must be 
deducted from tort damages.   
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equivalent, by which I mean a rule of strict (or more accurately, absolute 
enterprise) liability.  As discussed in Part II, there are certain advantages 
and disadvantages associated with both of these regulatory tools.  One 
advantage that they have in common is that, if done properly, both have 
the potential not only to optimize potential injurers’ care levels (as 
negligence and command-and-control regulation have the potential to 
do), but they can optimize activity levels as well, which even a perfectly 
functioning negligence or command-and-control regime will not.   
 
To illustrate, use the example from above but this time imagine 
that the only available care-level investment is a $25 enhancement that 
lowers risk from $100 to $20 – an $80 improvement.  (Say that the care-
level investment either reduces the probability of the $100,000 harm 
from .001 to .0002, or it reduces the likely harm itself from 100k to 20k).  
Still, this care-level investment leaves a residual (unavoidable) risk of 
$20.  In that case, if there were a command-and-control regulation in 
force that required potential injurers to make the efficient $25 care-level 
investment, and if that were the only regulation in effect, the potential 
injurers would tend to over-invest in this activity, as the $20 residual risk 
would be externalized to third parties.  That is, the potential injurers may 
engage in the activity even though the benefit to them is only, say, $15, 
because of the $20 residual-risk externality.   
 
In such a situation, tort law would provide no useful cost-
internalization/deterrence, assuming that negligence standard was the 
applicable liability rule.  This is because, if the regulated party were to 
comply with the command-and-control regulatory standard, she would 
also avoid a negligence claim and thus continue to externalize the $20 
residual risk.  If, however, the tort rule were strict liability instead, then 
the externality would be internalized and there would be no 
overinvestment in the activity.  There would only be investment in the 
activity up to the point at which the marginal social cost equals the 
marginal social benefit.  Notice also that the existence of the ex ante 
command-and-control care-level standard would not change the way in 
which strict liability should be implemented:  the court would still 
simply hold the injurer liable ex post for the actual harm caused, whether 
that harm turned out to be $100,000 or $20,000.  As explained, with 
strict liability, optimality is achieved simply by setting damages equal to 
harm.   
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Now imagine how things would change if, in place of the 
command-and-control ex ante regulatory requirement, there was a 
Pigovian tax.  How should tort law coordinate with such a non-tort 
regulatory regime?  A Pigovian tax, recall, is capable of optimizing both 
potential injurer care levels (assuming the potential injurer knows what 
care-level investments to make and that the Pigovian tax is adjusted 
downward as the regulated party makes those investments) and activity 
levels (because of simple cost-internalization principles).  As a result, if 
there were a fully optimizing (perfectly adjusting) Pigovian tax, then 
here again there would be no role for tort law as regulation.  So, in the 
recurring example, if there were a Pigovian tax of $100, tort law should 
be fully preempted/displaced.  Tort liability of any sort would generate 
useless administrative costs and, in the case of strict liability (unlike in 
the case of negligence), redundant sanctions.  This result, so far as I 
know, has not been addressed in the federal preemption jurisprudence (or 
literature).  That is, no case has held, nor even suggested in dicta (and no 
scholar has argued), that the existence of a fully cost-internalizing 
federal Pigovian tax should be interpreted (under the Supremacy Clause) 
to preempt state taxes or state tort law that has the effect of a tax (such as 
strict products liability).98     
 
If, however, the Pigovian tax were only partially cost-
internalizing, tort law could then provide an efficient supplementary 
sanction.  If the Pigovian tax, for example, were for some reason set at, 
say, $20 ($80 less than the optimal amount), then the optimal tort 
liability system would use strict liability to impose tort damages of only 
$80,000 – having an expected value of $80.  Thus, the presence of a 
Pigovian tax would inevitably require an adjustment to tort damages 
under a strict liability tort regime in order to optimize deterrence. 
 
Note also that if there were Pigovian tax in place and the 
prevailing tort liability rule were negligence, there is some possibility of 
deterrence redundancy if the tax is not perfectly adjusting – specifically, 
if the Pigovian tax were not adjusted to take into account the potential 
injurer’s likely adjustment to the threat of tort liability.  So, in our 
                                                 
98 The reasons, of course, that the case law and the commentators have ignored such 
potential conflicts between federal and state regulatory law are both that there are no 
real federal Pigovian taxes per se and, even if there were, federal preemption doctrine is 
generally not applied to taxes.  That is, even if the federal government imposes a tax on 
a particular transaction or product, states likely would still allowed to tax or otherwise 
regulate that transaction or product without raising any Supremacy Clause concerns.  
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example, imagine that the negligence rule induced potential injurers to 
make the efficient $25 care-level investment.  If the regulator 
nevertheless set the Pigovian tax at $100 (the pre-deterrence level of 
expected external harm), there would obviously be excessive deterrence; 
and potential injurers would engage in too little of the regulated activity.  
In such a case, the regulator should set the Pigovian tax at $20, which 
would account for the reduction in expected external harm induced by 
the negligence rule.   The same point, of course, could be made about 
overlapping Pigovian taxes and command-and-control regulations: the 
former should be adjusted to take account of the latter.99   
 
Current tort doctrine does not reflect any of these considerations.  
That result, however, could be simply because of the absence of any real 
Pigovian taxes and the predominance of negligence doctrine over strict 
liability at the state level.  Although there are so-called sin taxes (e.g., 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco sales) in the United States, both at the state 
and federal levels, there seems to be little effort to link those taxes to the 
amount of negative externalities associated with those activities.  The 
same is true of gasoline taxes.  In general, the federal government and 
the governments of the various states have made little use of taxes 
designed explicitly and precisely to be cost-internalizing.  Of course, a 
tax need not necessarily be labeled “cost-internalizing” or “Pigovian” to 
have that effect; and it is certainly true that some of the various 
individual taxes on various activities could be considered roughly and 
partially cost-internalizing.  And perhaps the reason tort law ignores 
those taxes is that the prevailing standard in most tort cases, and in cases 
involving activities likely to be subject to any sort of even roughly cost-
internalizing tax, is negligence.  As suggested above, so long as those 
quasi-Pigovian taxes are not thought to be fully optimizing (which would 
suggest that tort law should play not deterrent role), there is no need for 
negligence law to make an adjustment.  Negligence law can induce 
optimal care levels; and the quasi-Pigovian taxes can help with activity 
levels.100 
                                                 
99 Of course, if there is some possibility of error in the negligence determination, and 
there is a Pigovian tax, it may be efficient for the court to adjust the tort damages 
downwards. But this would true even if there were no ex post Pigovian tax.  That is, 
when there is a negligence standard in tort and that standard is uncertain in application, 
there can be over-deterrence, as potential injurers will be willing to take some degree of 
excessive care to be sure of getting being found non-negligent.  See Calfee & Craswell, 
supra note __. 
100 As mentioned above in the text, Pigovian taxes need to be adjusted to account for the 
care-level effects of a negligence rule or of command-and-control regulations.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
 The traditional normative economic analysis of tort law has 
worked out in impressive detail the characteristics of an optimal tort 
regime.  Thus, the theoretical circumstances under a liability rule of 
negligence would be superior, as a matter of efficienct deterrence, than a 
rule of strict liability, and the circumstances under which the reverse 
would be true, are well known and are considered a part of the L&E 
canon.101  What has been lacking is a study of how the 
deterrence/regulatory function of tort law should be affected by the prior 
existence of non-tort systems of regulation that applies to the same 
conduct in question.  The question could be put this way:  If a tort court 
is supposed to be implementing a combination of liability rules and 
damage awards that gives potential injurers optimal – not too little, not 
too much, but Goldilocks optimal – ex ante incentives to minimize the 
external harms caused by their activities, then should not tort law 
somehow coordinate with already existing non-tort regulatory regimes 
that may already, at least to some extent, have dealt with the externality 
in question?  Should not tort law be coordinated with other systems of 
regulation, so as to avoid redundancy of deterrence as well as 
unnecessary administrative costs?   
 
 This Article explores what such coordination might look like in 
situations in which the non-tort system of regulation is either agency-
based command-and-control requirements or Pigovians taxes, informal 
social norms, or even criminal law.  And under a strict set of 
assumptions, a fairly straightforward set of prescriptions emerges.  
                                                                                                                       
Whatever taxes currently exist that might be thought to approximate a Pigovian tax 
certainly do not make such adjustments.  Again, if strict liability were the prevailing 
tort doctrine and there were real or quasi-Pigovian taxes, then adjustments to tort 
damages might be appropriate, and of course such adjustments were require legislative 
approval.  Indeed, the argument has been made that taxes on tobacco use are so high 
that tort liability is not needed at all to internalize those costs and that for this reason, 
among others, tobacco companies should not be held liable in tort for the harms their 
products cause.  See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social 
Consequences of Smoking, in Tax Policy and the Economy 51, 69 (James M. Porterba 
ed., 1995). This argument ignores the fact that existing tobacco taxes make no 
adjustments for improvements in care levels and thus give no incentives to try to make 
less dangerous cigarettes.   
101 See sources cited supra.   
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Specifically, if we assume perfect rationality on the part of not only the 
regulated parties but also regulating parties (including courts), if we 
assume that the sole purpose of tort law is regulation of ex ante 
incentives, and, finally, if we assume that existing non-tort systems of 
regulation are a fixed part of the landscape, then the framework set out in 
this Article would makes some normative sense.  This conclusion has 
implications not only for how the negligence per se and regulatory 
compliance doctrines in tort should be applied by common law courts, 
but also for when courts should find state tort causes of action preempted 
by federal safety standards. 
 
58
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 105 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art105
